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They are [portrayed as] “monsters” and “beasts” . . . [b]ut sexual 
predators—and our powerful reaction to them—are doing 
another form of damage as well. We have come to think of these 
men as archetypical sex offenders and have shaped our public 
policy responses as if all sex offenders fit this mold. We are blind 
to the true nature of sexual violence in our society, which is far 
different from what we think it is . . . . [S]exual predators 
represent but a small fraction—a thin sliver—of the sexual 
criminals in our country.1 
– Eric Janus2 
 
The Court must emphasize that politics or political pressures 
cannot trump the fundamental rights of Class Members who, 
pursuant to state law, have been civilly committed to receive 
 
 1.  ERIC S. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT: AMERICA’S SEXUAL PREDATOR LAWS AND 
THE RISE OF THE PREVENTIVE STATE 2 (2006). 
 2.  Eric Janus is a member of the Minnesota Sex Offender Civil 
Commitment Advisory Task Force. 
2
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treatment. The Constitution protects individual rights even when 
they are unpopular. As Justice Sandra Day O’Connor sagely 
observed, “[a] nation’s success or failure in achieving democracy 
is judged in part by how well it responds to those at the bottom 
and the margins of the social order.” 3 
– Judge Donovan W. Frank 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The case of Karsjens v. Jesson has brought much needed 
attention to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP). The 
MSOP, a deeply troubling program set up under Minnesota’s Sex 
Offender and Civil Commitment and Treatment Act (MCTA),4 has 
expanded at unprecedented rates since its creation in 1994.5 Civil 
commitment is a scheme of involuntary commitment for the 
purpose of treating an underlying mental illness in order to ensure 
public safety.6 Most sex offenders are civilly committed to the 
MSOP for an indeterminate period of time after they serve their 
prison sentence.7 The MSOP consists of high security facilities, 
designed as prisons, as well as one less-restrictive facility for patients 
who have progressed through treatment.8 
Sexual predator civil commitments address only a small sliver 
of the sexual violence problem in our society9—and at a staggering 
 
 3.  Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1174 (D. Minn. 2015) (quoting 
Sandra Day O’Connor et al., The Third Annual William French Smith Memorial 
Lecture: A Conversation with Retired Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 63, 
65 (2009)). 
 4.  MINN. STAT. § 253D (2014 & Supp. 2015). 
 5.  Infra Section II.B.1; see, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, MINN. DEP’T HUM. 
SERVS. [hereinafter MSOP FAQs], http://mn.gov/dhs/people-we-serve/adults 
/services/sex-offender-treatment/faqs.jsp (last updated Mar. 15, 2016 3:13 PM). 
 6.  BRIAN STETTIN ET AL., TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., MENTAL HEALTH 
COMMITMENT LAWS: A SURVEY OF THE STATES 5 (2014), http://tacreports.org 
/storage/documents/2014-state-survey-abridged.pdf. 
 7.  CIVIL COMMITMENT TRAINING RES. CTR., SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT 
FACT SHEET 2 (2010), http://mn.gov/omhdd/assets/sex-offender-cc-fact-sheet       
-2010_tcm23-27594.pdf. 
 8.  Cynthia A. Frezzo, Treatment Under Razor Wire: Conditions of Confinement at 
the Moose Lake Sex Offender Treatment Facility, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 653, 674 (2015). 
 9.  In 2005, the most recent data available, 61,000 children and adults in 
Minnesota were sexually assaulted. During this same period of time, one in five 
women reported she had been raped in her lifetime and between eighty and 
ninety percent of those rapes were committed by someone the survivor knew. 
Sexual Violence, MINN. DEP’T HEALTH, http://www.health.state.mn.us/injury/topic 
3
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cost of $120,000 per year per individual housed at the MSOP.10 
Regardless, Minnesota’s three branches of government are 
unwilling to address the program’s constitutional concerns: 
Despite the Federal Court’s admonishment to state 
leadership to take immediate action to correct course, all 
three branches of Minnesota’s state government remain 
in paralysis. The last two governors have placed 
moratoriums on administrative releases from MSOP, and 
the state courts have repeatedly ignored opportunities to 
step-up judicial oversight . . . . [T]wo legislative sessions 
have passed without enacting necessary reforms.11  
The inability or unwillingness of Minnesota’s government to 
make changes, despite the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Minnesota’s directives, exemplifies the challenge of reforming a 
state system that has spiraled dangerously out of control.12 Part of 
the problem is due to societal fears and political pressure, which 
renders Minnesota’s government powerless to enact needed 
changes.13 The Karsjens case presents an opportunity to 
meaningfully reform this draconian system in Minnesota for the 
betterment of victims, patients, and communities.14 
This comment begins with a brief overview of some of the 
underlying theories at play in this case and why it is so important 
for both individuals and our justice system that civil commitment 
programs conform to their purported purpose to treat and 
rehabilitate.15 Next, it discusses the social considerations at play in 
the case, as well as a historical discussion of the rise in popularity of 
sex offender civil commitment nationwide and in Minnesota.16 
Then, it provides some context to help understand the MSOP—a 
description of the political climate at the time of its creation, 
 
/svp/sviolence.cfm#scope (last visited Mar. 7, 2016). 
 10.  The annual budget for the MSOP for fiscal year 2016 is $83.7 million. 
MSOP FAQs, supra note 5 (click on “What is the total operating cost of the sex 
offender treatment program?”). 
 11.  Jon Brandt & David S. Prescott, The Minnesota Sex Offender Program: Federal 
Intervention Part 1—The Challenges, SEXUAL ABUSE (Feb. 1, 2015), http:// 
sajrt.blogspot.com/2015/02/the-minnesota-sex-offender-program.html.  
 12.  See Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139 (D. Minn. 2015), appeal 
docketed, No. 15-3485 (8th Cir. Nov. 2, 2015). 
 13.  Infra Section III.A. 
 14.  Infra Part V. 
 15.  Infra Section II.A.1. 
 16.  Infra Section II.A.2. 
4
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information about demographics and current policies, and a 
comparison with other states’ sex offender civil commitment 
(SOCC) programs.17 Then, it explores the background of the 
Karsjens litigation, Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ arguments, Judge 
Donovan Frank’s holding, and the aftermath of the court’s 
decision.18 Finally, it discusses the next challenge in this case: to 
provide and implement an effective plan for reform after such a 
long period of dysfunction.19 
II. BACKGROUND 
In order to effectively understand how Minnesota got to this 
point in its civil commitment of sex offenders, it is important to 
explore the background of the constitutional considerations and 
societal concerns surrounding the theories of civil commitment 
and criminal punishment. Also important is a consideration of the 
rise of civil commitment popularity—in Minnesota and in other 
states in the nation. 
A. Theories of Civil Commitment Versus Criminal Punishment 
Civil commitment is an area where constitutional 
considerations of individual liberties frequently collide with societal 
outrage and political pressure. A central goal of SOCC is to protect 
public safety by removing from society individuals who have been 
determined to be sexually dangerous until they have been 
sufficiently rehabilitated. One problem with SOCC programs, as 
seen in Karsjens, is the ultimate goal of protecting the public 
frequently supersedes individuals’ rights to effective rehabilitation 
and a meaningful opportunity for successful treatment. 
1. Constitutional Considerations 
Judge Frank establishes one important tenant for any SOCC—
that it must not be punishment. He explains that “while 
incapacitation is a goal common to both the criminal and civil 
systems of confinement, retribution and general deterrence are 
reserved for the criminal system alone.”20 Civil commitment 
 
 17.  Infra Part III. 
 18.  Infra Part IV. 
 19.  Infra Part V. 
 20.  Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1143 (D. Minn. 2015) (quoting 
5
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programs should be therapeutic—a place where individuals 
rehabilitate constructively with sustainable progress towards an 
independent and self-reliant way of life.21 Judge Frank found that 
“the MSOP has developed into indefinite and lifetime detention. 
Since the program’s inception in 1994, no committed individual 
has ever been fully discharged from the MSOP, and only three 
committed individuals have ever been provisionally discharged 
from the MSOP.”22 Further distinguishing civil commitment and 
criminal punishment, Judge Frank found the following: 
[W]here, notwithstanding a “civil label,” a statutory 
scheme “is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to 
negate the State’s intention to deem it ‘civil,’” a court will 
reject a legislature’s “manifest intent” to create a civil 
proceeding . . . . Moreover, “[i]f the object or purpose” of 
a civil commitment law is to provide treatment, “but the 
treatment provisions were adopted as a sham or mere 
pretext,” such a scheme would indicate “the forbidden 
purpose to punish.”23 
Civil commitment systems are constitutionally excluded from 
punishing individuals.24 In our justice system, only criminal 
convictions can lead to punishment.25 John Rawls, among others, 
provided a reflection on two distinct justifications for 
punishment—the retributive view and the utilitarian view.26 His 
retributive view is that “punishment is justified on the grounds that 
wrongdoing merits punishment.”27 He states, “It is morally fitting 
that a person who does wrong should suffer in proportion to his 
wrongdoing.”28 Therefore, punishment follows guilt and the 
severity of punishment depends on the evil of the crime.29 
Rehabilitation is “the process of helping a person to readapt to 
society or to restore someone to a former position or rank.”30 
 
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 373 (1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring)), appeal 
docketed, No. 15-3485 (8th Cir. Nov. 2, 2015) . 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at 1147. 
 23.  Id. at 1168 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361). 
 24.  Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373. 
 25.  See generally John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 6–7 (1955). 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. at 4. 
 28.  Id. at 4–5. 
 29.  Id. at 5. 
 30.  ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRISONS & CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 831 (Mary F. 
6
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Rehabilitationas a stated goalis largely absent from the 
sentencing phase of the United States criminal justice system.31 
Funding for programs to rehabilitate within prisons has been 
decreased. State criminal statutes and sentencing guidelines use 
retribution in some form as their foundational principle so that a 
person’s criminal history and the severity of his or her crime 
determine his or her criminal sanction.32 While rehabilitation has 
lost popular and political support in the criminal justice system, it is 
a critical endeavor of a civil commitment system.33 
In states like Minnesota, where a theory of limiting 
retributivism—or modified just deserts34 drives our criminal 
sentencing guidelines35—offenders know the length of time they 
will be incapacitated for the commission of their crime.36 
 
Bosworth ed., 2005). See generally Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, A More 
Perfect System: Twenty-Five Years of Guidelines Sentencing Reform Purposes, 58 STAN. L. 
REV. 67, 70–71 (2005) (discussing rehabilitation and sentencing in the criminal 
justice system). 
 31.  See Frase, supra note 30, at 70–71; see also Michael Rothfield, As Rehab 
Programs Are Cut, Prisons Do Less to Keep Inmates From Returning, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 17, 
2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/17/local/me-rehab17 (stating 
California approved to cut $250 million a year from prison rehabilitation services 
at a time they were “most needed”). 
 32.  See Frase, supra note 30, at 77–78 (“[I]n practice, modern systems of law 
enforcement and punishment always function according to a limiting retributive 
model under which most offenders, in return for their cooperation, receive less 
severe sanctions than the maximum they deserve.”). 
 33.  See generally, e.g., Eric Janus, Sexually Violent Predator Laws: Psychiatry in 
Service to a Morally Dubious Enterprise, 364 MED. CRIME & PUNISHMENT 50 (2004) 
(discussing the political implications of the use of psychiatry in sexually violent 
predator laws). 
 34.  See Frase, supra note 30, at 76 & n.22 (citing NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS 
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 161, 182–87, 196–200 (1982)); MINN. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES COMM’N, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 9 (1980) (adopting modified just 
deserts approach); RICHARD S. FRASE, LIMITING RETRIBUTIVISM, IN THE FUTURE OF 
IMPRISONMENT 83, 90–104 (Michael Tonry ed., 2004) (discussing widespread 
support for basic elements of limiting retributivism); Richard S. Frase, Sentencing 
Principles in Theory and Practice, 22 CRIME & JUST. 363, 365–78 (1997) (summarizing 
Morris’ theory of punishment and Minnesota’s approach). See generally Janus, supra 
note 33, at 50. 
 35.  Frase, supra note 30, at 78; Janus, supra note 33, at 50; see Frase, supra 
note 30, at 76 (“Under this widely endorsed and adopted model, the offender’s 
desert defines a range of morally justified punishments, setting upper and lower 
limits on the severity of penalties that may fairly be imposed on a given 
offender.”). 
 36.  Frase, supra note 30, at 76; see id. at 73 (“[T]he limiting (negative) version 
7
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Minnesota’s switch in the early 1980s to determinate sentencing37 
meant, among many things, that offenders knowon the day of 
their sentencingthe exact amount of time they will serve in 
prison.38 
In a well-functioning civil commitment system, some 
individuals may never be released.39 But the focus should still be on 
rehabilitation for the duration of a person’s incapacitation in a civil 
system so that the people housed within the system and employees 
working at the system understand that it is legitimate—and not a 
pretext for continued punishment.40 A central problem with the 
MSOP is that because no individual has ever been fully released, no 
one detained within it believes that they will ever get out.41 This 
sense of uncertainty and the hopelessness felt by those at the 
MSOP, combined with the lack of release, is punitive—in some 
ways worse than prison.42 
Civil commitment systems in many states struggle to conform 
to their proper purpose—to treat and rehabilitate.43 One major 
difference between criminal justice systems and civil commitment 
systems is that a criminal system focuses on past behavior and the 
punishment for a past wrong.44 We understand we cannot punish 
dangerousness; we cannot apply criminal sanctions based on future 
dangerousness.45 To do so is unconstitutional.46 Therefore, 
 
of retributive theory merely sets outer limits on punishment, defining a range of 
permissible severity for any given case.”). 
 37.  See Janus, supra note 33, at 50. 
 38.  Offenders have a due process right to their release date from prison. See 
Carrillo v. Fabian, 701 N.W.2d 763, 773 (Minn. 2005). 
 39.  Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1144 (D. Minn. 2015). 
 40.  See generally Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371–72 (1997) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring). 
 41.  See Expert Report and Recommendations at 52, Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. 
Supp. 3d 1139, No. 0:11-cv-03659-DWF-JJK (D. Minn. 2015), ECF No. 658, http:// 
stmedia.startribune.com/documents/Expert+panel+report+on+sex+offender 
+program.pdf. 
 42.  See id.; Don Betzold, Commentary, What the Minnesota Sex Offender Program 
Was Meant to Be, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis) (June 30, 2015), http:// 
www.startribune.com/what-the-minnesota-sex-offender-program-was-meant-to-be 
/311061851 (“The sex offender treatment program is like a prison—only worse, 
because there’s no ‘out’ date.”). 
 43.  JANUS, supra note 1, at 2–3.  
 44.  E.g., Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1143–44. 
 45.  E.g., id. at 1169. 
 46.  E.g., id. at 1173. 
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Minnesota created a preventative detention system to address 
future risk of danger.47 Civil commitment seeks to prevent future 
harm to society—because it is forward looking.48 
Civil commitment systems detain (and aim to rehabilitate) 
individuals for the benefit of keeping society safe.49 Therefore, the 
conditions of that individual’s detention should not be punitive, 
but instead should be rehabilitative as the individual moves along a 
continuum of treatment with the ultimate goal of safe release back 
to the community.50 This is where many civil commitment systems 
fail.51 They fail in one respect because they do not actually provide 
meaningful treatment for individuals (including regular reviews of 
risk assessment).52 They fail in a greater respect because the actual 
experience of the individuals housed in these programs is in many 
cases worse than prison—it looks and feelswithin the scope of 
their daily liveslike punishment.53 
From the onset, civil commitment systems have been 
entangled with the criminal justice system.54 They provide a way to 
keep dangerous people incapacitated beyond their prison term. 
Currently, the dangerous individual is not punished but is instead 
housed (suffering an intrusion on his or her liberty) for the 
ultimate benefit of society.55 Many feel safer knowing people who 
have committed sexually violent crimes will not simply be released 
from prison—but instead will be housed somewhere far away from 
the mainstream. Using civil commitment schemes as a pretext for 
punishment degrades the integrity and morality of our criminal 
 
 47.  E.g., id. 
 48.  E.g., id. at 1143–44; see also Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: 
Cloaking Preventative Justice as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1446 (2001) 
(“Detention for longer than the deserved term of imprisonment is justified as 
preventing predicted future crimes. Such detention not only punishes an offense 
for which the detainee has not yet been convicted, but also punishes an offense 
that he has not yet committed. But the ability to punish the uncommitted crime, 
and thereby prevent it, is the genius of the current system’s cloaking of preventive 
detention as criminal justice.”). 
 49.  See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 372 (1997) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
 50.  See generally Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1167–68. 
 51.  Id. at 1174. 
 52.  See infra Section II.C.3. 
 53.  See infra notes 267–68. 
 54.  Robinson, supra note 48, at 1454 (discussing the relationship between 
prevention in civil commitment and criminal justice). 
 55.  Id. at 1446. 
9
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justice system.56 This unconstitutional use also violates the 
individual rights of the people it is designed to help, further 
degrading our sense of rehabilitative justice. 
2. Social Considerations 
Society’s collective interests in social policy directly influence 
the legislature and criminal justice system to act in accordance with 
its wishes.57 The obvious societal interest at stake in the release of 
sex offenders from prison is the safety of the public.58 All sex 
offenders are deemed the “‘worst of the worst’violent predators 
too dangerous for public release.”59 The image that comes to mind 
when thinking of a sex offender is naturally the “worst of the worst” 
within the population of all sex offendersthe most frightening 
image conceivable.60 Because of this, the public deeply fears sex 
offenders will reoffend because of their violent pasts.61 
It is extremely difficult to predict the rate of recidivism in sex 
offenders.62 The rate of recidivism varies between states as well as 
the length of time between follow-ups.63 What studies do show, 
though, is that sex offender treatment results in a reduction in the 
 
 56.  See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371–73 (1997) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
 57.  See generally, e.g., Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d, 1139, 1174 (D. Minn. 
2015); Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 25, 72. 
 58.  E.g., NANCY A. JOHNSTON, MINN. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., TREATMENT 
OVERVIEW: MINNESOTA SEX OFFENDER PROGRAM 1 (2015), http:// 
www.dhs.state.mn.us/main/groups/agencywide/documents/pub/dhs16_167937 
.pdf; see Betzold, supra note 42. 
 59.  Chris Serres, Minnesota Sex Offenders: Are They Really the ‘Worst of the Worst’?, 
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis) (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.startribune.com/minnesota 
-sex-offenders-are-they-really-the-worst-of-the-worst/233945281; see also Betzold, 
supra note 42. 
 60.  Serres, supra note 59. 
 61.  E.g., JANUS, supra note 1, at 2; MSOP FAQs, supra note 5 (click on “How 
does the program help clients transition to the community?”) (“Public safety is the 
department’s top priority.”). 
 62.  E.g., Melissa Hamilton, Public Safety, Individual Liberty, and Suspect Science: 
Future Dangerousness Assessments and Sex Offender Laws, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 697, 712 
(2011). 
 63.  See, e.g., Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 39; 
Hamilton, supra note 62, at 708; No Easy Answers: Sex Offender Laws in the US, HUM. 
RTS. WATCH (Sept. 11, 2007), https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/09/11/no-easy    
-answers/sex-offender-laws-us. 
10
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rate of sexual recidivism.64 One study found that the rate of sexual 
recidivism in sex offenders who receive treatment is 12.3%, while 
those who do not receive treatment reoffend at a rate of 16.8%.65 
B. Rise in Sex Offender Civil Commitment Popularity 
The origins and rise of SOCC are fairly uniform between 
Minnesota and other jurisdictions around the nation. Both 
experienced a first and second wave of SOCC laws, which were 
heavily influenced by a heightened concern about sexual offenses, 
heavy media attention, and ultimately, legislative action. The 
differentiating factor between the two is the case-specific instances 
in Minnesota and other states alike. 
1. Increase in Popularity Nationwide 
The mid-1930s bore a first wave of hysteria surrounding sex 
crimes.66 Sexuality became a respected study and “the influence of 
psychoanalytic theories on American psychiatry during the 1930s 
provided an intellectual base for a sexual theory of crime.”67 The 
increased relationship between the criminal justice system and 
psychiatry led to the use of a new term, the sexual psychopath, to 
explain the patterns of wearisome prisoners, ultimately leading to 
the creation of a new deviant population.68 As the study of sexual 
psychopaths expanded into the late 1930s, writers linked sexual 
deviances such as “exhibitionists, sadists, masochists, and voyeurs” 
to the commission of sexual crimes.69 The chief psychotherapist at a 
hospital in Washington D.C., Benjamin Karpman, identified sexual 
psychopaths by their inability to control their sexual impulses 
 
 64.  E.g., Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 32, 38; 
REAGAN DALY, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, TREATMENT AND REENTRY PRACTICES FOR SEX 
OFFENDERS: AN OVERVIEW OF STATES 3–4 (2008), http://www.csom.org 
/pubs/Treatment%20and%20Reentry%20for%20SO%20an%20overview%20of 
%20states.pdf. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Estelle B. Freedman, “Uncontrolled Desires”: The Response to the Sexual 
Psychopath, 1920–1960, 74 J. AM. HIST. 83, 84 (1987); Bela August Walker, Essay: 
Deciphering Risk: Sex Offender Statutes and Moral Panic in a Risk Society, 40 U. BALT. L. 
REV. 183, 188 (2010). 
 67.  Freedman, supra note 66, at 88. 
 68.  See id. at 88–89. 
 69.  Id. at 91 (internal citation omitted). 
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because these people were “all instinct and impulse.”70 His vision 
caught fire because of its connection to the theory of the born 
criminal and eventuated in intense media attention, and, 
ultimately, the first wave of sex offender laws—the sexual 
psychopathic personality statutes.71 
a. The First Wave of Sex Offender Civil Commitment Laws 
Michigan passed the first sexual psychopathic personality 
statute in 1937.72 The incident that ultimately led to Michigan’s law 
was the murder and mutilation of a young girl, whose body was 
found in an apartment by a man who had been committed to a 
mental institution for sex crimes.73 The statute was subsequently 
found unconstitutional, but by 1939, three additional states had 
passed sexual psychopathic personality statutes—Illinois in 1938, 
and California and Minnesota in 1939.74 Eventually, more than half 
of the states enacted sexual psychopathic personality statutes, which 
afforded sex offenders special medical and legal treatment.75 
Committees were civilly committed as an alternative to prison 
sentences.76 The laws were “touted as a scientific, enlightened 
response to dangerous sex offenders that would achieve two goals: 
remove the sex offender from the community, and treat the 
underlying mental condition.”77 This trend continued into the 
1960s and subsequently went widely unused until the second wave 
of sex offender civil commitment laws.78 
b. The Second Wave of Sex Offender Civil Commitment Laws 
Washington was the first state to reinvigorate sex offender civil 
commitment laws in 1990.79 Its new statute was passed as a response 
to the intense public outcry after recidivist sex offenders committed 
 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  See id. 
 72.  Roxanne Lieb et al., Sexual Predators and Social Policy, 23 CRIME & JUST. 43, 
55 (1998). 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. at 55–56. 
 77.  Id. at 55 (internal citation omitted). 
 78.  See id. 
 79.  See WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, A SUMMARY OF RECENT FINDINGS 
FROM THE COMMUNITY PROTECTION RESEARCH PROJECT 1 (1994). 
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a series of sex crimes against women and children.80 Many states 
followed shortly thereafter and modeled their statutes after 
Washington.81 Today, twenty states and the federal government 
have SOCC statutes.82 
The general outline of most statutes for SOCC is that the 
person has a history of sexual offenses, a mental abnormality or 
personality disorder, and because of the combination of the two, is 
deemed likely to sexually reoffend.83 Unlike the first wave of SOCC 
laws, sex offenders are now committed near the end of their prison 
sentence.84 
Constitutional challenges were brought under the second wave 
of SOCC laws. The first time the U.S. Supreme Court heard a case 
that challenged the new wave of SOCC statutes was in Kansas v. 
Hendricks.85 Leroy Hendricks was civilly committed under Kansas’ 
Sexually Violent Predator Act, which permits commitment of sex 
offenders who, because of a mental abnormality or personality 
disorder, are likely to engage in future sex offenses.86 On appeal, 
the Kansas Supreme Court ruled the statute unconstitutional 
because the statutory definition of “mental abnormality” did not 
satisfy substantive due process.87 Instead, it overruled Kansas’ 
statute, stating that SOCC must be initiated because of a “mental 
illness.”88 On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled in the converse: 
The Act’s definition of “mental abnormality” satisfies 
“substantive” due process requirements . . . . The Act 
unambiguously requires a precommitment finding of 
dangerousness either to one’s self or to others, and links 
 
 80.  E.g., Marie A. Bochnewich, Prediction of Dangerousness and Washington’s 
Sexually Violent Predator Statute, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 277, 277 (1992) (citing WASH. 
REV. CODE. ANN. § 71.09.010–.902 (West 1975 & Supp. 1991)); see, e.g., Lieb et al., 
supra note 72, at 66. 
 81.  Id. at 67. 
 82.  Monica Davey, A New Look at Sex Offenders and Lockups, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
30, 2015, at A1. 
 83.  See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02, subdiv. (a) (West, Westlaw through 
2015 Reg. Sess.); MINN. STAT. § 253D.02, subdiv. 16 (2014 & Supp. 2015); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 980.01, subdiv. 7 (West, Westlaw through 2015); Bochnewich, supra 
note 80, at 277. 
 84.  See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03, subdiv. (a)(1) (Westlaw); MINN. 
STAT. § 253D.07, subdiv. 1; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.015, subdiv. (2)(a) (Westlaw). 
 85.  521 U.S. 346, 346 (1997). 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
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that finding to a determination that the person suffers 
from a “mental abnormality” or “personality disorder.” 
Generally, this Court has sustained a commitment statute 
if it couples proof of dangerousness with proof of some 
additional factor, such as a “mental illness” or “mental 
abnormality,” . . . for these additional requirements serve 
to limit confinement to those who suffer from a volitional 
impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their 
control. The Act sets forth comparable criteria with its 
precommitment requirement of “mental abnormality” or 
“personality disorder.”89 
The second challenge to the constitutionality during a second 
wave of SOCC statutes was only a few years later in Kansas v. Crane, 
which challenged the other the lack of control over sexual 
behavior.90 The Kansas Supreme Court had ruled that Kansas’ 
SOCC statute was unconstitutional because it required a showing of 
the inability to control sexual actions as a prerequisite for civil 
commitment.91 Although not formally codified in Kansas’ SOCC 
statute, the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that the statute contained 
an implied requirement of the inability to control one’s sexual 
behavior.92 Because Crane had some control over his actions, the 
state supreme court ruled that Crane’s civil commitment was 
unconstitutional.93 On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled 
the state supreme court’s decision.94 Instead, the Court relied on 
Hendricks and ruled that there was “no requirement of total or 
complete lack of control, but the Constitution does not permit 
commitment of the type of dangerous sexual offender considered 
in Hendricks without any lack-of-control determination.”95 
The civil commitment of sex offenders was revitalized in the 
1990s due to select heinous sex crimes against women and 
children, which were subsequently given immense media attention, 
increased political pressure, and ultimately led to the resurfacing of 
 
 89.  Id. at 346–47. 
 90.  534 U.S. 407, 407 (2002). 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id.; John M. Fabian, Kansas v. Hendricks, Crane and Beyond: “Mental 
Abnormality” and “Sexual Dangerousness”: Volitional vs. Emotional Abnormality and the 
Debate Between Community Safety and Civil Liberties, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1367, 
1399 (2003). 
 93.  Crane, 534 U.S. at 407; Fabian, supra note 92, at 1400. 
 94.  Crane, 534 U.S. at 407. 
 95.  Id. 
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SOCC statutes nationwide. As discussed below, Minnesota follows 
this pattern of change and implementation. 
2. Increase in Popularity in Minnesota 
In order to understand the current design and programming 
of the MSOP, the historical origins of the civil commitment of sex 
offenders in Minnesota must be explored. In the 1990s, there was a 
considerable increase in SOCC followed abruptly by another 
substantial increase in commitment in the early 2000s. Both 
increases were due in large part to societal and media influence, 
which gave rise to what the MSOP is today. 
Civil commitment for sex offenders existed in Minnesota long 
before the MSOP.96 Unlike the MSOP, civil commitment for sex 
offenders in Minnesota was historically rooted as an alternative to a 
criminal charge and conviction.97 From 1939 to the 1980s, those 
deemed to have a “psychopathic personality” under Minnesota’s 
Sexual Psychopathic Personality Statute were civilly committed to 
the Minnesota State Security Hospital in St. Peter98 for an indefinite 
period of time.99 
Within its first year of enactment, Minnesota’s Sexual 
Psychopathic Personality Statute’s constitutionality was 
challenged.100 The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the law and 
the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, stating that the “sexual 
psychopathic personality” law was not unconstitutionally uncertain 
or vague.101 To satisfy the “psychopathic personality” requirement, 
sex offenders had to display: 
conditions of emotional instability, or impulsiveness of 
behavior, or lack of customary standards of good 
judgment, or failure to appreciate the consequences of 
personal acts, or a combination of any such conditions,     
. . . render such person irresponsible for personal conduct 
 
 96.  JANUS, supra note 1, at 22; see MINN. STAT. § 253D.02, subdiv. 15 (2014), 
declared unconstitutional by Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1147 (D. Minn. 
2015). 
 97.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1146; JANUS, supra note 1, at 22. 
 98.  See Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1146; JANUS, supra note 1, at 29. 
 99.  OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, PSYCHOPATHIC PERSONALITY 
COMMITMENT LAW 9 (1994) [hereinafter PSYCHOPATHIC COMMITMENT LAW]. 
 100.  State ex rel. Pearson v. Prob. Court, 205 Minn. 545, 287 N.W. 297 (1939), 
aff’d, 309 U.S. 270 (1940). 
 101.  Id. 
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with respect to sexual matters and thereby dangerous to 
other persons.102 
In 1989, the Minnesota Legislature broadened the use of 
SOCC.103 During sentencing, judges were required to decide if civil 
commitment was appropriate for sexual offenders, as opposed to 
the ad hoc commitment system previously utilized.104 If appropriate, 
the judge recommended the sex offender to the county attorney, 
who initiated proceedings for civil commitment.105 
SOCC fell into disuse in the 1970s and 1980s.106 However, in 
1992 the Minnesota Legislature enacted a statute to modify the 
procedural screening process of those imprisoned for sexual 
offenses.107 The new statute called for the evaluation of high-risk 
offenders by the Department of Corrections near the end of their 
sentence prior to their release from prison.108 In conjunction with 
its previous use, sex offenders were civilly committed rather than 
serving prison sentences.109 Many states followed suit. The second 
generation of SOCC statutes across the United States varied, but 
had central characteristics in common: their specific purpose is to 
confine and treat offenders determined to have a mental 
abnormality and are likely or highly likely to reoffend.110 
In the 1990s, screening was reserved for “repeat sex offenders 
who either had failed or refused to participate in sex offender 
treatment while in prison.”111 Today, the Department of 
Corrections recommends prisoners to the county attorney in the 
county of the offense underlying their imprisonment and the 
county attorney initiates civil commitment proceedings.112 
 
 102.  JANUS, supra note 1, at 29 (quoting Pearson, 205 Minn. at 555, 287 N.W. at 
302). 
 103.  See Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1146. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  JANUS, supra note 1, at 29; PSYCHOPATHIC COMMITMENT LAW, supra note 
99. 
 107.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1146. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Eric S. Janus & Jon Brandt, Karsjens v. Jesson: Challenging the Un-Civil 
Commitment of Civil Rights, ACCESS TO JUST., July 2, 2015, at 4, http:// 
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/litigation_committees 
/access/summer2015.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 111.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1146 (D. Minn. 2015). 
 112.  Id. at 1146–47. 
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The evaluation of sex offenders near the end of their prison 
sentence marked a drastic change in the character of SOCC.113 
Previously, sex offenders were civilly committed as an alternative to 
serving prison sentences, seeking to care for “those too sick to 
deserve punishment.”114 Although “[i]t is fundamental to our 
notions of a free society that we do not imprison citizens because 
we fear that they might commit a crime in the future[,]”115 sex 
offenders today are civilly committed for an indeterminate period 
of time,116 in addition to completing prison sentences in order to 
ensure public safety.117 
In 1994, the Minnesota Legislature further broadened SOCC 
to include individuals found to be a “sexually dangerous person” in 
addition to the previous Sexual Psychopathic Personality Statute.118 
Today, sex offenders are civilly committed if they possess a “sexual 
psychopathic personality” and/or are a “sexually dangerous 
person.”119 
Civil commitment in Minnesota rose in frequency after the 
passage of the new screening process in 1992.120 Civil commitment 
went from being a prison alternative to a virtual extension of the 
sex offender’s prison sentence.121 In 1990, the total population of 
civilly committed sex offenders was only two people122 and in 1992, 
the population was twenty-two.123 The MSOP was created in 1994 to 
 
 113.  JANUS, supra note 1, at 22. 
 114.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 115.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1143. 
 116.  MINN. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., MINNESOTA SEX OFFENDER PROGRAM 
ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT 23 (2012) [hereinafter ANNUAL PERFORMANCE 
REPORT]. 
 117.  Id.; JANUS, supra note 1, at 22. 
 118.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1146. 
 119.  MINN. STAT. § 253D.02, subdiv. 4 (2014 & Supp. 2015). Sex offenders may 
be civilly committed under Minnesota Statutes section 235D.02, subdivisions 15 
and 16 or a previous version of such, including section 526.10. MINN. STAT.            
§ 253D.02, subdivs. 15–16; MINN. STAT. § 526.10 (1994). 
 120.  See Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1146; PSYCHOPATHIC COMMITMENT LAW, 
supra note 99, at xi (“[T]he number of psychopathic personality commitments has 
increased sharply, largely because the Department of Corrections now routinely 
screens soon-to-be-released sex offenders and notifies county attorneys if the 
department thinks [Psychopathic Personality] commitment may be appropriate.”). 
 121.  See JANUS, supra note 1, at 22. 
 122.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1146. 
 123.  Id. 
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deal with the increase in civilly committed sex offenders.124 By 
December 2012, the total population of the MSOP was 678 
individuals125 and as of December 31, 2015, 726 sex offenders are 
confined to the MSOP.126 To account for the drastic increase in the 
population of the MSOP, one must explore how changes in public 
policy are the direct result of voluminous media coverage and 
intense public outcry. 
III. THE MSOP  
In recent years, the MSOP has grown substantially in its 
number of patients, likely due to two specific cases—Dennis 
Linehan and Alfonso Rodriguez, Jr.—who had a history of 
committing sex offenses. Both significantly influenced the civil 
commitment of sex offenders in Minnesota because of the public 
outcry associated with their cases and actions. Because of this, 
current MSOP programming and statistics show that the changes to 
the system and the statute under which sex offenders are civilly 
committed was a knee-jerk reaction to a select few heinous cases. As 
a result, the MSOP is different than other SOCC programs in the 
nation and greatly lags behind in its effectiveness. This forces us to 
ask: What has the MSOP become? 
A. Growth of the MSOP in Minnesota 
Two very public cases changed the civil commitment of sex 
offenders in Minnesota. The case of Dennis Linehan directly 
changed the statute under which sex offenders are civilly 
committed in Minnesota.127 The case of Alfonso Rodriguez, Jr., who 
reoffended when he killed Dru Sjodin after his release from prison 
for a sex crime,128 changed the way in which the new statute was 
implemented. 
Dennis Linehan’s case is one of swift legislative reform. 
Linehan had a long history of sexual offenses prior to his release 
 
 124.  See id. at 1146–47. 
 125.  ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT, supra note 116, at 22. 
 126.  MSOP FAQs, supra note 5 (click on “How many people are in the 
Minnesota Sex Offender Program?”). 
 127.  See, e.g., JANUS, supra note 1, at 27. 
 128.  See, e.g., Caroline Palmer & Bradley Prowant, Re-Thinking Minnesota’s 
Criminal Justice Response to Sexual Violence Using a Prevention Lens, 39 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REV. 1584, 1596 (2013). 
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on parole in 1992.129 In 1965, at the age of twenty-four, he killed a 
fourteen-year-old girl while sexually assaulting her.130 Prior to the 
sexual assault and murder of his 1965 victim, Linehan had sexually 
assault or attempted to sexually assault seven known victims.131 After 
a ten-year prison sentence, Linehan escaped from a minimum-
security prison and was arrested a few days later and two states away 
from Minnesota for trying to sexually assault a twelve-year-old 
girl.132 
In 1992, Linehan was paroled for good behavior after a ten-
year prison term.133 He had served a total of twenty-seven years in 
prison for multiple sex crimes.134 Although he had completed 
chemical dependency and sex offender treatment in prison,135 he 
became one of the first candidates for sexual predator commitment 
in Minnesota.136 
Linehan’s civil commitment proceedings were brought under 
the Pearson test, which allowed civil commitment of people who: 
by a habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters, have 
evidenced an utter lack of power to control their sexual 
impulses and who, as a result, are likely to attack or 
otherwise inflict injury, loss, pain or other evil on the 
objects of their uncontrolled and uncontrollable desire.137 
Because civil commitment went widely unused until the early 
1990s,138 the Pearson test was forgotten as well.139 After years of 
litigation and appeals, the Minnesota Supreme Court found that 
the State did not meet its burden of showing Linehan had an “utter 
 
 129.  JANUS, supra note 1, at 27. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 243.166, subdiv. 5a (2014 & Supp. 2015). 
 134.  JANUS, supra note 1, at 27. 
 135.  Id. at 28. 
 136.  Id. at 27. 
 137.  Id. at 29 (quoting State ex rel. Pearson v. Prob. Court, 205 Minn. 545, 555, 
287 N.W. 297, 302 (1939)) (emphasis added). Interestingly enough, the Pearson 
test required a lack of power to control, while criminal sex crimes require a form 
of intent or control. See Larry Oakes, The New Life Sentence: A Long-Standing, Thorny 
Issue for Minnesota and the Courts, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), June 8, 2008, at 14A, 
LEXIS. 
 138.  See supra note 112. 
 139.  JANUS, supra note 1, at 29. 
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lack of power to control” himself in sexual matters under the 
Pearson test.140 
Public outcry after the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision 
was instantaneous. Newspapers headlined the court’s decision in 
anger and political officials and candidates publicly spoke out 
against the decision.141 Mike Hatch, then campaigning for state 
attorney general, urged “the governor to call a special session of 
the legislature to ‘tighten’ (more accurately, ‘loosen’) the civil 
commitment law.”142 Hatch was critical of the Pearson test. Instead, 
he advocated that the legislature look closer at sex offender 
recidivism and the risk to public safety involved in releasing sex 
offenders into the community.143 
In response to public outcry, Governor Arne Carlson called 
the legislature into special session.144 
Just eight days before statewide primary elections, the 
governor officially called for a one-day, one-bill special 
 
 140.  In re Linehan (Linehan I), 518 N.W.2d 609, 614 (Minn. 1994) (stating the 
Ramsey County District Court had failed to provide clear and convincing evidence 
that Linehan was utterly unable to control his sexual impulses); In re Linehan, 503 
N.W.2d 142, 148 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that (1) Linehan was a person 
who met the standards for commitment as a psychopathic personality and, (2) the 
psychopathic personality statute was constitutional). 
 141.  “After this court denied the state’s petition for rehearing in Linehan I, the 
governor announced that the state would move Linehan to an old staff residence 
just outside the prison and keep him under constant surveillance.” In re Linehan 
(Linehan II), 557 N.W.2d 171, 198 (Minn. 1996) (Tomjanovich, J., dissenting) 
(citing Paul Gustafson & Robert Whereatt, Rapist/Murderer Wins Release—and Tight 
Surveillance, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Aug. 16, 1994, at 1A). After, Linehan’s 
attorney stated his treatment was appalling and the governor responded by saying, 
“I’d much rather make a mistake on the side of public safety than be 
overwhelmingly concerned with some attorney’s perception of the civil rights of 
Mr. Linehan.” Id. Meanwhile, the Ramsey County prosecutor stated, “These are 
dangerous people and we’ve got to protect the women and children in our 
communities.” Linehan II, 557 N.W.2d at 198 (Tomjanovich, J., Dissenting) 
(quoting Mimi Hall, A Furor Brews over Release of Sex Offenders, USA TODAY, Aug. 17, 
1994, at 3A). “[An] article quoted State Representative David Bishop, who called 
Chief Justice A. M. Keith ‘the chief zookeeper of the zoo. . . . Now he’s proposing 
to let the tigers out one by one to see if they’re dangerous.’” JANUS, supra note 1, at 
31–32. 
 142.  JANUS, supra note 1, at 31. 
 143.  See id. 
 144.  E.g., Betzold, supra note 42; Jason Hoppin, Are Sex Offenders Patients or 
Prisoners?, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, (Feb. 21, 2010), http://www.twincities.com 
/ci_14438035. 
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legislative session. The legislature convened one week 
later and in just 1 hour, 37 minutes passed the SDP Act by 
a 65–0 margin in the senate and a 133–0 margin in the 
house. Immediately prior to the session, the bill’s drafters 
had told their colleagues to avoid speaking about Linehan 
specifically because, “Whatever we say on the floor will be 
used against us . . . . It’s going to be used to challenge the 
bill.”145 
The legislature unanimously passed the new laws, which 
included the former “psychopathic personality” act (renamed the 
Sexual Psychopathic Personality Act (SPP Act)), and adding those 
who are “sexually dangerous person[s]” as defined in the SDP Act 
to the restructured laws, collectively called MCTA.146 As a clear 
response to Linehan’s case, the legislature wrote, “[I]t is not 
necessary to prove that the person has an inability to control the 
person’s sexual impulses” in the reformed SOCC laws.147 
A few days later, the state filed a petition to civilly commit 
Linehan under the restructured legislation.148 Under the new 
standard, the state sought to commit Linehan under the SDP Act149 
and its new requirements.150 
During the Linehan II proceedings, a psychiatric expert 
testified that Linehan had antisocial personality disorder and the 
district court found it highly likely that Linehan would reoffend.151 
The court of appeals and the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed 
 
 145.  Linehan II, 557 N.W.2d at 198 (Tomjanovich, J., Dissenting) (citing 
Donna Halvorsen & Robert Whereatt, Sexual Predator Bill OK’d, Signed, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis), Sept. 1, 1994, at 1A; Robert Whereatt, Legislators, Carlson Agree to 
Session; Ground Rules Set with Goal of Avoiding Partisanship, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), 
Aug. 24, 1994, at 1B). 
 146.  Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1147 (D. Minn. 2015). 
 147.  MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subdiv. 18c(b) (1998); see JANUS, supra note 1, at 
32. 
 148.  In re Linehan (Linehan III), 594 N.W.2d 867, 870 (Minn. 1999); JANUS, 
supra note 1, at 32. 
 149.  Linehan III, 594 N.W.2d at 870. 
 150.  The new laws required the person to have “engaged in a course of 
harmful sexual conduct[,] . . . manifested a sexual, personality, or other mental 
disorder or dysfunction[,] and as a result, [be] likely to engage in acts of harmful 
sexual conduct.” MINN. STAT. § 253B.02 18(a)(1)–(3) (1998). 
 151.  In re Linehan, No. P8-94-0382, at *9–13, 23–24, 26 (Ramsey Cty. Dist. Ct., 
July 27, 1995). 
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the district court’s ruling.152 To this day, Linehan is civilly 
committed to the MSOP.153 
Dennis Linehan’s story is one of heinous sex crimes and quick 
legislative action resulting from immense outcry from the media, 
the public, and individual legislators in response to his failed civil 
commitment under the “psychopathic personality” act after  
Linehan I. Arguably, the media and individual legislators, in 
conjunction, is the most effective vehicle for notions of social 
change today. Conversely, legislators and the media are the most 
effective conduits for influencing societal mindsets regarding a 
particular social issue. A combination of both forms of influence 
feeding off one another creates the perfect recipe for change. In 
the case of Dennis Linehan, the combination of the three quickly 
changed the way sex offenders are civilly committed in Minnesota. 
Sex offenders are now civilly committed under a broadened set 
of laws implemented directly in response to Linehan’s case. Today, 
Linehan’s story remains in the memories of many Minnesotans 
because of its impact on Minnesota law and its surrounding 
controversy. In recent months since the Karsjens decision, the 
media is quick to retell the tale of Dennis Linehan,154 whose case 
changed the fate of civilly committed sex offenders in Minnesota.155 
Instead of the outcry that followed Linehan I, the media is now 
more likely to question the Minnesota Legislature’s hasty revision 
of sex offender commitment law.156 Individual legislators have 
followed suit.157 After twenty-five years and a ruling of the 
 
 152.  Linehan III, 594 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1999); In re Linehan, 544 N.W.2d 308 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1996). 
 153.  JANUS, supra note 1, at 28. 
 154.  See, e.g., John Croman, Judge Rules Minnesota Sex Offender Program 
Unconstitutional, KARE 11, Aug. 10, 2015, http://www.kare11.com/story/news 
/local/2015/06/17/judge-rules-minnesota-sex-offender-program-unconstitutional 
/28863371/; Pat Kessler, Reality Check: Minnesota’s Sex Offender Treatment Program, 
CBS MINN., June 18, 2015, http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2015/06/18/reality      
-check-minnesotas-sex-offender-treatment-program; Editorial, Searching for Answers 
on Sex Offenders: Can Indefinite Confinement Be the Right Choice for All?, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis), June 15, 2008, at 4OP. 
 155.  Compare MINN. STAT. § 253D.02, subdivs. 15–16 (2014 & Supp. 2015), with 
MINN. STAT. § 526.10 (1994). 
 156.  Compare Linehan III, 594 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1999), and In re Linehan, 
544 N.W.2d 308 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996), with JANUS, supra note 1, at 27. 
 157.  See, e.g., Kathy Sheran, MSOP: A Minnesota State Senator’s Perspective, 41 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 689, 690 (2015). 
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unconstitutionality of the MSOP, the media, legislators, and the 
public are finally asking themselves: Did we get it wrong? 
Alfonso Rodriguez, Jr.’s case is one of swift change in the 
implementation of the MSOP. Rodriguez was released from prison 
in May 2003 after serving a twenty-three-year sentence as a level 
three repeat sex offender.158 Reaffirming the public’s fears, he 
reoffended. 
Dru Sjodin was a college student that Rodriguez abducted 
from a shopping center in Grand Forks, North Dakota on 
November 22, 2003.159 Her body was later found in Minnesota in 
April of 2004 after the snow melted.160 She had been raped, 
tortured, and murdered.161 
Ten days after Sjodin’s abduction, Rodriguez was arrested and 
charged with her kidnapping.162 His charges were later amended to 
include willfully transporting Sjodin in interstate commerce and 
murder.163 Rodriguez’s case was tried in federal court where he was 
sentenced to death.164 He is currently on death row.165 
Rodriguez’s case garnered significant national attention.166 He 
has never been an inmate at the MSOP, but this did not stop his 
 
 158.  Sex offender levels are determined by the Minnesota Department of 
Corrections’ policies, which use risk assessments to assign individual offenders a 
numerical risk value based on the individual’s risk of reoffending. Level I 
offenders have a predicted probability of sexual recidivism of 3.49% or lower, 
Level II offenders have a predicted probability of sexual recidivism between 3.50% 
and 9.99%, and Level III offenders have a predicted probability of sexual 
recidivism at or above 10%. MINN. DEP’T CORR., POLICY 205.220, PREDATORY 
OFFENDER: REGISTRATION, COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION, VICTIM NOTIFICATION, LEVEL 3 
WEBSITE, AND RISK LEVEL REASSESSMENT REQUEST (2013), http://www.doc.state.mn 
.us/DocPolicy2/html/DPW_Display_TOC.asp?Opt=205.220.htm; JANUS, supra note 
1, at 1. 
 159.  JANUS, supra note 1, at 1. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  See, e.g., Stephen J. Lee, 10 Years Later, Dru Sjodin’s Kidnapping, Murder 
Changed Law and Society, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, (Nov. 21, 2013), http:// 
www.twincities.com/localnews/ci_24575871/10-years-later-dru-sjodins-kidnapping 
-murder-changed. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  United States v. Rodriguez, 389 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1335 (D.N.D. 2005), 
aff’d on other grounds, 581 F.3d 775 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 164.  Dan Gunderson, Judge Sentences Alfonso Rodriguez Jr. to Death, MINN. PUB. 
RADIO NEWS, Feb. 8, 2007, http://www.mprnews.org/story/2007/02/08 
/rodriguezsentence. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  See id. 
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case from forever changing both the way Minnesotans view the 
MSOP and the way in which the Department of Corrections 
implements the referral of inmates to the program. The public was 
outraged that “officials decided not to take the . . . step of seeking 
[Rodriguez’s] civil commitment to a secure treatment facility as a 
‘sexually dangerous person.’”167 Countless Minnesota and North 
Dakota residents searched for Ms. Sjodin when she was abducted—
the public had an emotional stake in her case and did not feel she 
received justice.168 
As a result of Sjodin’s murder, Congress passed the Adam 
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act,169 which President George 
W. Bush signed into law on July 27, 2006.170 A provision of the Act 
includes the creation of the Dru Sjodin National Sex Offender 
Public Website (Sjodin Act).171 The website provides nationwide sex 
offender data which allows concerned residents to search for sex 
offenders in their area.172 The Sjodin Act is an example of public 
backlash on sex offender policy on a national level.173 
On the local level, the Minnesota Department of Corrections 
drastically increased the number of inmate referrals to the MSOP 
in response to public outcry174 after Sjodin’s death.175 Between 1991 
 
 167.  JANUS, supra note 1, at 1. 
 168.  See, e.g., Missing N.D. Student Dru Sjodin Found, FOX NEWS (Apr. 18, 2004), 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2004/04/18/missing-nd-student-dru-sjodin-found 
.html. 
 169.  Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No.       
109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–91 (2006)). 
 170.  The Dru Sjodin Story, NAT’L SEX OFFENDER PUB. WEBSITE, https:// 
www.nsopw.gov/en/Home/DruSjodin (last visited May 19, 2016). 
 171.  Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act § 120, 120 Stat. at 597 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16920 (2006)); see The Dru Sjodin Story, supra note 170. 
 172.  About NSOPW, NAT’L SEX OFFENDER PUB. WEBSITE, https://www.nsopw.gov 
/en/Home/About (last visited May 19, 2016). 
 173.  Another example of public backlash on national sex offender policy is 
Washington State’s enactment of Megan’s Law, which was passed in memory of 
Megan Kanka, who was raped and murdered by a released sex offender who lived 
across the street from her. Lucy Berliner, Sex Offenders: Policy and Practice, 92 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1203, 1217 (1998) (citing William Glaberson, At Center of “Megan’s Law” 
Case, A Man the System Couldn’t Reach, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1996, at C10). Congress 
later added Washington’s version of Megan’s Law to the Jacob Wetterling Act in 
1996. Id. Megan’s Law is now in effect in all fifty states. Id. 
 174.  “‘How do you not contemplate the ongoing detention of these offenders, 
or at least severe restrictions on their activities?’ [North Dakota Lieutenant 
Governor Drew Wrigley] said. ‘Are we to do nothing but react to the next victim? 
The public is fed up.’” Chuck Haga, Ten Years After Dru Sjodin’s Abduction, “She 
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and 2003, prior to Sjodin’s murder, the Minnesota Department of 
Corrections referred about twenty-six offenders per year to county 
attorneys.176 In December of 2003 alone, one month after Sjodin’s 
abduction, the Department of Corrections referred 236 inmates to 
the MSOP.177 As of 2011, the number of individuals referred to the 
MSOP each year since Sjodin’s death was six times the total 
number of people referred to the MSOP between 1991 and 2003.178 
“A large increase has followed the substantial increase in DOC 
referrals since December 2003.”179 The increase in referrals to the 
MSOP is a direct result of Sjodin’s death180: 
Attorney Thomas Heffelfinger, who worked . . . on 
[Rodriguez’s] case as U.S. attorney for Minnesota, said he 
saw a rapid shift after Sjodin’s murder in public and 
official sentiment over how to deal with high-risk 
offenders. “The focus was on getting knowledge and 
information out to people and keeping sex offenders 
locked up through civil commitment,” he said. “Over here 
in Minnesota, more pressure was put on county attorneys 
to review these cases for civil commitment a lot more 
quickly and more aggressively.”181 
 
Reminds Us Every Day How Precious Life Is”, MINNPOST (Nov. 22, 2013), https:// 
www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2013/11/ten-years-after-dru-sjodins-abduction 
-she-reminds-us-every-day-how-precious-. 
 175.  Palmer & Prowant, supra note 128, at 1595–96. 
 176.  SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT ADVISORY TASK FORCE, SELECTED 
MATERIALS REGARDING THE SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT ADVISORY TASK FORCE 
39 (2013), http://www.senate.mn/committees/2013-2014/1016_Committee_on 
_Judiciary/SelectedMaterials%20Regarding%20the%20Sex%20Offend_3.pdf 
(citing OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, EVALUATION REPORT: CIVIL 
COMMITMENT OF SEX OFFENDERS 1 (2011)). 
 177.  Mark A. Ostrem, MSOP: A County Attorney’s Perspective, 41 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REV. 698, 699 (2015). 
 178.  OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, EVALUATION REPORT: CIVIL 
COMMITMENT OF SEX OFFENDERS 28 (2011) [hereinafter OLA EVALUATION REPORT], 
http://www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us/ped/pedrep/ccso.pdf. See generally Lucy 
Massopust & Raina Borrelli, “A Perfect Storm”: Minnesota’s Sex Offender Program—
More Than Twenty Years Without Successful Reintegration, 41 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
706 (2015). 
 179.  OLA EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 178, at 29. 
 180.  Ostrem, supra note 177, at 699; see, e.g., GOVERNOR’S COMM’N ON SEX 
OFFENDER POLICY, FINAL REPORT 7 (2005), http://archive.leg.state.mn.us/docs 
/2005/other/050099.pdf. 
 181.  Lee, supra note 161. 
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Since Sjodin’s murder, SOCC has increased sharply largely 
because of her murder.182 The current population of the MSOP is 
“[d]ue in no small part to the Sjodin case.”183 Today, Minnesota has 
the highest number of civilly committed sex offenders per capita of 
any state in the United States184 and boasts the lowest percentage of 
release of any other state.185 
The case of Alfonso Rodriguez, Jr.’s release and subsequent re-
offense affirmed the public’s fear of released sex offenders. After 
Rodriguez was released from prison, he kidnapped and murdered 
Dru Sjodin, an innocent college student.186 As an obvious result, the 
public was outraged that he was not civilly committed as a sex 
offender.187 Sjodin’s murder led to many drastic federal policy 
changes.188 Society’s outrage after Sjodin’s murder also led to 
Minnesota’s drastic changes in the implementation of its SOCC 
laws and as a direct result, there has been a substantial increase in 
the number of civilly committed sex offenders since her death.189 
B. Overview of the Current Program 
Currently, sex offenders civilly committed in the MSOP 
encompass a broad range of individuals, varying in age, mental 
capacity, and life experiences. Despite this fact, the MSOP is a 
uniform system for all patients. An overview of the current program 
is needed to gauge the scope of the deficiencies in Minnesota’s civil 
commitment of sex offenders. 
 
 182.  Id.; see also supra notes 178–79. 
 183.  Haga, supra note 174. 
 184.  E.g., Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1148 (D. Minn.), motion to 
certify appeal denied, No. CIV. 11-3659, 2015 WL 4478972 (D. Minn. July 22, 2015); 
ERIC J. MAGNUSON & JAMES ROSENBAUM, SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT ADVISORY 
TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 1 (2013) [hereinafter TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT], 
https://cbsminnesota.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/sotf-report.pdf; Haga, supra 
note 174; see also Sex Offender Civil Commitment Advisory Task Force, MINN. DEP’T 
HUM. SERVS., http://mn.gov/dhs/general-public/about-dhs/advisory-councils-task 
-forces/sex-offender-task-force.jsp (providing resources related to the Task Force 
including reports, court orders, meeting minutes, and links to legislation). 
 185.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1147. 
 186.  See supra notes 162–64. 
 187.  JANUS, supra note 1, at 136–37; Lee, supra note 161. 
 188.  United States v. Rodriguez, 389 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1335 (D.N.D. 2005) 
aff’d on other grounds, 581 F.3d 775 (8th Cir. 2009); Gunderson, supra note 164; 
Lee, supra note 161. 
 189.  See supra notes 180–84. 
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1. Statistics 
In recent years, the MSOP has become larger than life. There 
are currently 726 individuals civilly committed to the MSOP, 
costing Minnesota taxpayers $83.7 million per year.190 This means 
that each committee costs taxpayers almost $120,000 per year. 
Clients in the MSOP are between the ages of twenty-one and 
ninety-three, with an average age of forty-eight.191 As of June 2015, 
sixty-seven juvenile-only offenders were committed to the MSOP.192 
For too long, too many people have been civilly committed to 
the MSOP. To date, five people have been provisionally discharged 
in the twenty-two year history of the MSOP.193 In contrast, the same 
number of people were civilly committed to the MSOP between 
October 26, 2015 and December 31, 2015in just over two 
months.194 
2. Programming 
The MSOP consists of three phases, each of indeterminate 
length.195 Although modules or phases are common amongst 
jurisdictions with SOCC programs,196 programming at the MSOP 
has changed many times since its inception in 1994.197 The MSOP’s 
Theory Manual states that the most important factor in sex 
offender treatment is the client’s willingness to change.198 Other 
important factors include skill acquisition, rehearsal, and 
 
 190.  MSOP FAQs, supra note 5 (click on “What is the total operating cost of the 
sex offender treatment program?”); see Esme Murphy, WCCO Investigates 
Minnesota’s Sex Offender Program, CBS MINN. (Apr. 22, 2015), http:// 
minnesota.cbslocal.com/2015/04/22/wcco-investigates-minnesotas-sex-offender    
-program (“It’s outrageous. The taxpayers should be screaming to their politicians 
about it.”). 
 191.  MSOP FAQs, supra note 5 (click on “How old are the clients?”). 
 192.  Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1152 (D. Minn.), motion to certify 
appeal denied, No. CIV. 11-3659, 2015 WL 4478972 (D. Minn. July 22, 2015). 
 193.  MSOP FAQs, supra note 5 (click on “Has anyone ever been released from 
the program?”). 
 194.  As of October 26, 2015, 722 people were civilly committed to the MSOP. 
By December 31, 2015, that number increased to 726. See MSOP FAQs, supra note 
5. 
 195.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d. at 1153. 
 196.  Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 27. 
 197.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d. at 1153. 
 198.  Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 28. 
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implementation, which allow clients to make changes and 
implement new behaviors.199 
Although the MSOP’s treatment manual permits individuals to 
begin treatment in different stages of treatment depending on 
their background and previous sex offender treatment, all 
committed individuals at the MSOP start in Phase I.200 While client 
willingness to change is the most important factor in treatment at 
the MSOP, clients are not assessed on their willingness to change 
when determining phase placement upon intake at the MSOP.201 
In its current programming, Phase I of the MSOP concentrates 
on rule conformity, engagement in treatment, and emotional 
regulation.202 It also serves as a basic introduction to treatment 
concepts.203 Clients do not receive any specific sex offender 
treatment during Phase I.204 
Civilly committed sex offenders begin actual treatment for 
sexual offenses in Phase II, which focuses on “addressing patterns 
of sexually abusive behavior and cycles.”205 This concentrates on the 
person’s sexual offending history, maladaptive patterns, and the 
person’s motives and rationale behind their behavior.206 The goal 
of Phase II is the development of coping strategies to avoid 
recidivism.207 
Civil committees begin reintegration planning during Phase 
III.208 Reintegration planning is available only for individuals in 
 
 199.  Id. 
 200.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d. at 1154. 
 201.  Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 30; see Karsjens, 
109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, at 1154 (“There are no reports or assessments conducted at 
the time of admission to determine what phase of treatment a committed 
individual should be placed in at the MSOP.”). 
 202.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d. at 1153; see Expert Report and 
Recommendations, supra note 41, at 30; OLA EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 178, 
at 55. 
 203.  Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 30; OLA 
EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 178, at 55. 
 204.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d. at 1153; OLA EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 
178, at 64. 
 205.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d. at 1153; see also OLA EVALUATION REPORT, supra 
note 178, at 55 (“In Phase Two, clients are expected to disclose their sexual 
offenses and understand their patterns of sexual abuse.”). 
 206.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d. at 1153. 
 207.  Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 30. 
 208.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d. at 1153. 
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Phase III.209 Here, clients focus on the application of skills they 
learned during Phase II by utilizing coping mechanisms.210 This 
phase is considered the maintenance stage of treatment.211 During 
Phase III, clients continue to “reside in a secure area, but may be 
allowed supervised access to the community.”212 Nearly all 
individuals, regardless of phase, wear electronic monitoring ankle 
bracelets.213 In addition to wearing electronic monitoring ankle 
bracelets, clients in Phase III are monitored by Global Positioning 
Satellite because they are given more freedom within the 
community.214 
Clients at the MSOP receive the vast majority of their 
treatment in a group setting of eight to ten individuals led by co-
facilitators.215 Little individual therapy is offered to MSOP clients.216 
Although the MCTA requires that civilly committed sex offenders 
be mentally ill,217 the MSOP does not have a full-time psychiatrist 
on staff to serve its population of 726 clients.218 
C. Why Minnesota Is Different than the Rest of the Nation 
Minnesota’s treatment of civilly committed sex offenders 
differs greatly from the national norm. The MSOP fails to 
differentiate treatment programming for subgroups of individuals 
such as those with severe mental illnesses and those with cognitive 
capacity limitations.219 It also fails to adequately provide the 
appropriate number of hours of treatment per week based on 
national norms and to conduct annual risk assessments.220 Finally, 
 
 209.  Id. 
 210.  Id. 
 211.  Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 31. 
 212.  Id. 
 213.  Id. 
 214.  Id. 
 215.  Id. at 27. 
 216.  See id. 
 217.  “Substantive due process requires that civil committees may be confined 
only if they are both mentally ill and pose a substantial danger to the public as the 
result of that mental illness.” Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. at 1166 (citing Foucha v. 
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77 (1992) (noting that a “committed acquittee is entitled 
to release when he has recovered his sanity or is no longer dangerous”); Call v. 
Gomez, 535 N.W.2d 312, 319 (Minn. 1995)). 
 218.  Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 18. 
 219.  See infra Section II.C.1. 
 220.  See infra Sections II.C.2.–.3. 
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the MSOP fails to provide a reduction in custody or discharge for 
eligible clients.221 
1. Failure to Differentiate Treatment Programming 
The majority of SOCC programs conduct a formal pre-
treatment evaluation of each client in order to ascertain treatment 
goals and targets.222 Those SOCC programs have different 
treatment tracks for clients based on a number of factors, including 
individual intellect, personality, mental health status, and 
behavioral issues.223 Essentially, other SOCC programs across the 
nation differentiate their treatment of civilly committed sex 
offenders based on individual needs.224 
Minnesota does no such thing. Psychological assessments are 
conducted sporadically and have little to no effect on identifying an 
individualized treatment program based on key factors such as 
individual intellect.225 The MSOP is a one-size-fits-all treatment 
program for all clients regardless of age, cognitive ability, sex, 
mental illness, or other physical disabilities.226 
An example of the MSOP’s failure to differentiate treatment 
for subgroups of its clientele is seen in its population of clients with 
severe mental illnesses such as schizophrenia, major depression, 
schizo-affective disorder, and other conditions that significantly 
affect the ability of clients to progress in treatment.227 As previously 
stated, the MSOP is inadequate in addressing mental illness in 
clients.228 Other nationwide SOCC programs employ a 
comprehensive approach to mental health issues, which includes 
clinical training, supervision, and psychiatric services.229 In contrast, 
the MSOP narrowly focuses training and treatment upon 
 
 221.  See infra Section II.C.4. 
 222.  Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 26. 
 223.  Id. at 10. 
 224.  See id. 
 225.  See id. at 26. 
 226.  See generally Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1154–56 (D. Minn. 
2015). “The confinement of the elderly, individuals with substantive physical or 
intellectual disabilities, and juveniles, who might never succeed in the MSOP’s 
treatment program or who are otherwise unlikely to reoffend, is of serious 
concern for the Court and should be for the parties as well.” Id. at 1175. 
 227.  Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 15. 
 228.  Id. at 16. 
 229.  Id. at 16–17. 
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problematic sexual behavior, which lends to an environment 
wherein mental health disorders are not understood by MSOP 
clinical staff.230 Because of this, MSOP clients with significant 
mental illness have severe difficulties in progressing through phases 
of treatment.231 
Another example of the MSOP’s failure to differentiate the 
treatment program for a subgroup of its population is in its 
treatment implementation for clients in the Alternative Program.232 
Clients in this program have “significant barriers to successful 
participation in the conventional treatment program, most often 
seen in limited intellectual functioning, but also including clients 
with cognitive limitations, mental illness, and hearing deficits.”233 
Nationwide best practices include providing specialized tracks for 
subgroups of clients, such as the special needs population.234 The 
MSOP does not differentiate treatment for special needs patients.235 
The Final Report of the Rule 706 Expert Report and 
Recommendations in connection to the Karsjens case found: 
Interviews with MSOP treatment and supervisory staff 
indicated that the treatment goals and criteria for phase 
advancement used for clients in the Alternative Program 
are the same as those for anyone else in the MSOP . . . . 
[O]ne report stated, “[T]he client does not appear to 
understand the treatment, but he tries hard.” In spite of 
this acknowledgement, there was no evidence in the 
records that staff took steps to modify the program so that 
clients with special needs could advance in treatment. 
This represents a fundamental failure to adequately 
address the treatment responsivity needs of these clients   
. . . . Some clients were simply unable to read the Matrix 
Factors pocket cards with which they had been provided, 
while others could read them but demonstrated a 
profound lack of understanding of the concepts.236 
Because of the MSOP’s failure to differentiate treatment 
programming, some patients in the Alternative Program may not 
 
 230.  Id. at 15. Additionally, the MSOP staff perceives symptoms of severe 
mental illness as attention seeking behaviors. Id. at 15–16. 
 231.  Id. at 15. 
 232.  See id. at 20. 
 233.  Id. 
 234.  See id. at 34. 
 235.  See id. at 20–21. 
 236.  Id. at 20–21. 
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ever be able to complete treatment because of their cognitive 
capacity limitations.237 
2. Failure to Provide the Appropriate Number of Hours of Treatment 
Per Week 
The MSOP does not provide its patients with enough time in 
treatment per week. The national average of the number of hours 
per week in SOCC programming is sixteen hours.238 Programming 
includes educational, recreational and vocational, community 
meetings, individual therapy on a case-by-case basis, 
psychoeducational modules, and core groups.239 The MSOP 
reported to the Sex Offender Civil Commitment Programs Network 
that its clients spent an average of eight to eleven hours in 
treatment per week.240 In reality, clients in the MSOP spend an 
average of seven-and-a-half hours per week in treatment,241 which is 
on the low end of the number of treatment hours provided to its 
patients compared to national best practices standards.242 
3. Failure to Conduct Valid, Annual Risk Assessments 
Minnesota does not conduct annual risk assessments on its 
patients to determine if patients meet the statutory requirements 
for continued treatment.243 The vast majority of states with SOCC 
programs require regular risk assessments of their clients.244 The 
MSOP was the only SOCC facility that reported to the Sex Offender 
Civil Commitment Programs Network that it conducts risk 
 
 237.  See Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1157 (D. Minn. 2015). 
 238.  Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 26. 
 239.  See id. at 27 (citing SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT PROGRAMS NETWORK, 
SOCCPN ANNUAL SURVEY OF SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT PROGRAMS 28 (2014) 
[hereinafter SOCCPN ANNUAL SURVEY], http://soccpn.org/images/SOCCPN 
_Annual_Survey_2014_revised.pdf). 
 240.  Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 27. 
 241.  Id. (citing OLA EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 178, at 62–63). 
 242.  OLA EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 178, at 64. 
 243.  Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1159 (D. Minn. 2015); Expert 
Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 33. 
 244.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1159; Expert Report and Recommendations, 
supra note 41, at 33. “In comparison to most other SOCC programs, in which 
periodic reviews of civil commitment status are conducted on a set periodic basis 
(e.g., annually), it is unusual and of great concern . . . that assessments of this sort 
are only completed at MSOP when a client is actually petitioning for release or 
movement to CPS.”). Id. 
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assessments only upon petition for a reduction in custody or 
release.245 Until very recently, the MSOP has not conducted risk 
assessments on individuals until they petition for a reduction in 
custody.246 As of June 2015, the only risk assessment the MSOP has 
ever conducted outside of the petitioning process was for a class 
member involved in the Karsjens litigation.247 
The MSOP does not have a manual to standardize risk 
assessments.248 In addition, risk assessors at the MSOP do not 
receive any formal training regarding the constitutional standards 
for commitment or discharge.249 Minnesota’s legal standard was not 
incorporated into the language of MSOP risk assessments until 
June 2014.250 
4. Failure to Reduce Custody or Discharge Eligible Patients 
The MSOP’s stated goal is “to treat and safely reintegrate 
committed individuals at the MSOP back into the community.”251 
The program is different than others in the nation in its failure to 
reduce custody or discharge eligible patients due to the lack of 
treatment progression, the limited less-restrictive options available, 
the stark fact that some clients no longer benefit from treatment, 
and the complicated petitioning process for a reduction in 
custody.252 The combination of each of these explains why the 
MSOP is arguably the least effective SOCC treatment program in 
the nation. 
a. Lack of Treatment Progression 
Clients have historically progressed through the treatment 
phases of the MSOP very slowly, if at all.253 As of October 2012, the 
MSOP indicated a range of between six to nine years total in 
treatment for a model client.254 In contrast, the nationwide average 
 
 245.  SOCCPN ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 239, at 48. 
 246.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1159. 
 247.  Id. 
 248.  Id. at 1159. 
 249.  Id. at 1161. 
 250.  Id. 
 251.  Id. at 1153. 
 252.  Id. at 1171–72. 
 253.  Id. at 1157. 
 254.  Id. at 1156. 
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of years spent in a SOCC program is about five to seven.255 The 
MSOP’s indication is not reality, though. Clients are held to 
“stringent and perhaps unrealistic expectations for phase 
movement.”256 To date, only five individuals have been provisionally 
discharged from the program.257 Some clients in the Alternative 
Program have been in either Phase I or Phase II for over five 
years.258 It has been only in recent years that clients have begun 
progressing through the phases of treatment, likely because of the 
pending Karsjens litigation.259 
Outside evaluators and assessors have repeatedly voiced 
concerns about the lack of treatment progression at the MSOP260: 
Every year since 2006, the Site Visit Auditors have voiced 
concerns in all of their evaluation reports to the MSOP 
about the disproportionately high number of committed 
individuals in Phase I compared to those in Phase III of 
the treatment program. In 2011 and 2012, the Site Visit 
Auditors reported that “[s]low movement through the 
program and the multiple required legislative steps for 
discharge in Minnesota hampers program effectiveness” 
and that “[t]he lack of clients ‘getting out’ can be 
demoralizing to clients and staff . . . .”261 
Indeed, clients at the MSOP feel hopeless about their 
prospects of treatment progression and the ultimate goal of 
discharge.262 During the Karsjens litigation, an MSOP client testified 
that he believes that “the only way to get out is to die.”263 One of the 
Karsjens Class Members, Harley Morris, died in the MSOP while on 
hospice care.264 
 
 255.  Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 27. 
 256.  Id. at 44; see Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1149. 
 257.  MSOP FAQs, supra note 5 (click on “Has anyone ever been released from 
the program?”). Another individual was released and subsequently recommitted 
for noncompliance with the provisional discharge plan, although not for 
reoffending. Id. 
 258.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1157. Arguably, this is due in part to the 
MSOP’s failure to differentiate treatment programming. See supra Section II.C.1. 
 259.  See Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1157. 
 260.  Id. 
 261.  Id. (alterations in original). 
 262.  Id. at 1151. 
 263.  Id. 
 264.  Id. at 1153. 
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There are some clients in the MSOP who are at the wrong 
location for treatment265 or are in the wrong phase of treatment.266 
MSOP clinicians testified during the Karsjens litigation that there 
are some clients who should have been allowed to progress to a 
later phase of treatment but were not permitted to do so.267 This 
could be because the MSOP is the only SOCC program in the 
nation that uses the Matrix factors to determine phase progression, 
or because the MSOP has not implemented a system to determine 
if clinicians are consistently scoring clients based on the Matrix 
factors.268 
Additionally, some clients have regressed in treatment phases 
due to programming changes the MSOP has implemented.269 One 
MSOP client progressed to the final phase of treatment and was 
sent back to the newly implemented Phase I because the MSOP 
adopted its current three-phase model.270 “[S]ome individuals have 
been confined at the MSOP for over twenty years and have 
completed the treatment program three times, but are currently 
only in Phase II due to subsequent treatment program changes.”271 
On top of that, MSOP clients do not know what they need to do 
and what scores they must maintain to progress to the next phase 
of treatment.272 
 
 265.  The MSOP has one female patient named Rhonda Bailey. Minnesota is 
one of only two states that house female patients with its male counterparts. Ms. 
Bailey is in a unit with twenty-two males. She was committed in 1993 and has been 
housed in the St. Peter facility since 2008. The MSOP Site Visit Auditors did not 
even realize she was housed there until 2014. Until recently, she had group 
therapy with men and was denied other treatments. The Rule 706 Expert Report 
recommended that Ms. Bailey be transferred or provisionally discharged from the 
MSOP to a supervised treatment facility and the Karsjens Plaintiffs motioned to 
have Ms. Bailey transferred to a different treatment facility. During the Karsjens 
proceedings, Dr. Haley Fox, Clinical Director of the MSOP St. Peter treatment 
facility, testified that “it would be optimal if Bailey were placed in a different 
facility.” Despite this, the MSOP has not taken any action to implement their 
recommendations. Id. at 1151. 
 266.  Id. at 1154. 
 267.  See id. at 1145. 
 268.  See id. at 1156 (“The MSOP did not provide training to all staff on the 
Matrix factors until 2013 and 2014, and the MSOP did not provide any training on 
the Matrix scoring until 2014.”). 
 269.  Id. at 1158. 
 270.  Id. 
 271.  Id. 
 272.  Id. 
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b. Limited Less-Restrictive Options Available 
The MCTA calls for less rights-restrictive options to a 
maximum-security facility for those in the MSOP, yet few to no such 
options exist.273 Because all clients begin treatment in Phase I, and 
the only sites for Phase I treatment are the maximum-security 
facilities in Moose Lake and St. Peter,274 they are not afforded the 
option available in the MCTA that permits the committing court to 
place clients in a less-restrictive alternative.275 Even though many 
MSOP clinical staff members have stated that some clients in the 
program could be safely placed in less-restrictive alternatives,276 the 
MSOP lacks alternatives such as halfway houses,277 transitioning 
housing,278 and adult foster care.279 
For those who are actually able to progress to Phase III of the 
treatment program, clients often wait years at a high-security facility 
because there is not a bed open in the less-restrictive alternative to 
which they seek to be transferred.280 The only less-restrictive 
alternative is Community Preparation Services (CPS),281 which takes 
years to complete.282 CPS houses a maximum of thirty-eight 
clients.283 In addition to the thirty-eight beds at CPS, “the MSOP has 
less than twenty beds available for less-restrictive alternative 
placements” through contracted services similar to CPS.284 Between 
CPS and the contracted services, there are a maximum of fifty-eight 
 
 273.  Id. at 1172; see also MINN. STAT. § 253D.07, subdiv. 3 (2014 & Supp. 2015). 
 274.  See supra note 200 and accompanying text; see also infra note 409 and 
accompanying text. 
 275.  MINN. STAT. § 253D.07, subdiv. 3; Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1172. 
 276.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1152. This includes some of the sixty-seven 
juvenile-only offenders in the MSOP treatment program. Id. 
 277.  Id. 
 278.  Id. at 1152–53. 
 279.  Id. 
 280.  See id. at 1150; Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 
44. 
 281.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1150. Programming includes “community-
based treatment and maintenance, building pro-social support networks, 
participation in support groups, vocational training, budgeting and saving, 
volunteering, and demonstrating healthy, pro-social lifestyle choices. . . . While on 
campus, CPS clients participate in facility counts and are subject to room searches 
and drug testing.” MINN. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., DHS-6316-ENG 1-14, MSOP 
PROGRAM REINTEGRATION 1 [hereinafter MSOP REINTEGRATION]. 
 282.  See Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1150. 
 283.  Id. 
 284.  Id. at 1153. 
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beds available for 726 MSOP clients.285 This means that only 7.9% 
of individuals are permitted to participate in CPS or its contracted 
counterpart, and that the number of beds available is 
disproportionate to the population of those who are eligible for 
transfer to a less-restrictive facility.286 
c. Some Clients at the MSOP No Longer Benefit from 
Treatment 
Some MSOP clients no longer benefit from treatment.287 Both 
physicians who testified during the Karsjens proceedings and Site 
Visit Auditors who visited the MSOP identified clients who had 
reached the maximum benefit of treatment and would no longer 
benefit from sex offender treatment in a high-security setting.288 
Unlike other states in the nation, the MSOP does not have a 
classification to express treatment completion.289 
Other states have created delineated ends to their SOCC 
programs to signify completion of treatment.290 Florida created 
language such as “maximum treatment benefit” in its programming 
to indicate that its clients have received the full extent of treatment 
services and no longer benefit from programming.291 In addition, 
Wisconsin statutorily defined this objective as “significant progress 
in treatment” to denote that clients who were sufficiently successful 
in inpatient treatment be considered for less-restrictive supervised 
release into the community.292 
d. Difficult Petitioning Process for a Reduction in Custody 
Clients at the MSOP are permitted to petition for a reduction 
in custody to a less-restrictive facility or to be provisionally 
discharged.293 The Executive Director of the MSOP may petition for 
a reduction of custody or a provisional discharge on behalf of a 
 
 285.  Id. at 1150, 1153. See generally MSOP FAQs, supra note 5. 
 286.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1153, 1158. 
 287.  Id. at 1158. 
 288.  See id.  
 289.  Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 37. 
 290.  See id. 
 291.  Id. 
 292.  Id.  
 293.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1161 (citing MINN. STAT. § 253D.27, subdivs. 
1–2 (2014 & Supp. 2015)).  
37
Woolman and Anderson: Going Against the Grain of the Status Quo: Hopeful Reformations t
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2016
11. Woolman_FF4 (1363-1433) (Do Not Delete) 6/24/2016  11:29 AM 
1400 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1363 
client as well.294 The first step in this process is to file a petition with 
the Special Review Board (SRB).295 
MSOP clients must wait six months after their initial 
commitment to the MSOP to petition the SRB.296 Clients who 
previously petitioned to the SRB and were denied a reduction in 
custody or a provisional discharge must wait until six months has 
passed since the previous decision until they are permitted to begin 
the petitioning process again.297 The same time frame applies to the 
Executive Director petitioning on behalf of a client.298 
After the client or the Executive Director petition to the SRB, 
the MSOP schedules a SRB hearing for the client.299 The SRB 
consists of professionals appointed by the Commissioner of the 
Department of Human Services.300 The SRB holds up to sixteen 
hearings per month,301 which are held in the order they are 
received.302 As of June 2014, there were 105 pending SRB 
petitions.303 Petitions filed after January 2010 had an average wait 
time of 224.3 days from when the petition was filed to the date the 
SRB hearing took place.304 After the hearing, the SRB must issue a 
report recommending or denying the client’s petition for discharge 
or a reduction in custody within 30 days.305 
If the SRB denies the client’s petition, the client may petition 
to the Minnesota Supreme Court Appeals Panel (SCAP) for a 
rehearing.306 The SCAP is the only body that has legal authority to 
grant provisional discharges or a reduction in custody.307 The SCAP 
 
 294.  Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 253D.27, subdivs. 1–2).  
 295.  Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 253D.27, subdivs. 1–2).  
 296.  Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 253D.27, subdiv. 2); see also Expert Report and 
Recommendations, supra note 41, at 38. 
 297.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1161 (citing MINN. STAT. § 253D.27, subdiv. 
2); see also Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 38. 
 298.  See Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1161 (citing MINN. STAT. § 253D.27, 
subdiv. 2). 
 299.  Id. at 1163.  
 300.  Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 38. 
 301.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1163.  
 302.  Id. at 1161. 
 303.  Id. at 1163; Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 76. 
 304.  Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 76. 
 305.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1161 (citing MINN. STAT. § 253D.27, subdivs. 
3–4 (2014 & Supp. 2015)). 
 306.  Id. at 1160; Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 76. 
 307.  See Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1161; Expert Report and 
Recommendations, supra note 41, at 76. 
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hearing is statutorily required to be held “within 180 days of the 
filing of the petition [with the SCAP] unless an extension is 
granted for good cause.”308 If the client or the MSOP does not file 
for a rehearing with the SCAP within thirty days, the SCAP will 
adopt the SRB’s recommendations and the client must start the 
process over.309 
Unlike the initial civil commitment hearings, the client has the 
burden of proof at the SCAP rehearing.310 The client “must 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the transfer is 
appropriate.”311 Additional difficulties MSOP clients face during the 
petitioning process are: discharge criteria that are more stringent 
and harder to prove than the commitment criteria;312 the lag in 
time between a SCAP hearing and a SCAP decision;313 the MSOP’s 
failure to provide legal assistance to those who cannot navigate the 
complex petitioning process;314 and the reality that clients are 
required to petition to two boards, the SRB and the SCAP, even 
though the SRB cannot make any legal determinations regarding a 
client’s reduction in custody or provisional discharge.315 
Another factor that makes the petitioning process burdensome 
is that the MSOP does not actively petition on behalf of clients even 
though current law permits it.316 Clients, rather than the MSOP, are 
 
 308.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1161 (citing MINN. STAT. § 253D.28, subdiv. 
1(b)). 
 309.  See id. at 1161–62. 
 310.  Id. at 1162 (citing MINN. STAT. § 253D.28, subdiv. 2(d)); Expert Report 
and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 76. 
 311.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1162 (citing MINN. STAT. 253D.28, subdiv. 
2(e)).  
 312.  Id.; Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 76. 
 313.  Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 76; see also 
Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1163; Expert Report and Recommendations, supra 
note 41, at 6. 
 314.  Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 76, 78. 
 315.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1161; Expert Report and Recommendations, 
supra note 41, at 38, 76. 
 316.  Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 78. 
Taking an active role in petitioning is important for several reasons: 
(1) some clients may not have the cognitive ability to understand the 
discharge/petitioning process; (2) current mental health practices 
require practitioners to ensure clients are treated in the least restrictive 
environment; (3) MSOP administration has an ethical obligation to 
release individuals who no longer meet the criteria for SOCC in order 
to ensure that client civil liberties are protected; and (4) research 
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burdened with the responsibility of petitioning for release rather 
than the MSOP petitioning for the release of individuals who are 
eligible for a reduction in custody or for discharge.317 Although the 
MSOP does not play an active role in the petitioning process, it has 
a strong influence on the process.318 Very often, the SRB and SCAP 
will not grant a decrease in custody or a provisional discharge 
unless the MSOP supports it.319 
Minnesota’s system for reduction in custody differs from that 
of other SOCC states: 
Instead of a bifurcated reduction in custody process, most 
states require clients to be evaluated on an annual or 
every two years basis to determine whether clients 
continue to meet the commitment criteria. A hearing is 
then held, in which the state typically has the burden to 
show (usually by clear and convincing evidence) that the 
client continues to require civil commitment. These 
hearings are held within reasonable time-frames of the 
annual reviews as to ensure that clients not meeting 
commitment criteria are not detained longer than 
necessary.320 
In addition, other SOCC programs do not have an SRB or 
equivalent, and instead have one body for judicial review, such as 
the SCAP.321 
e. The MSOP Lags Behind Other SOCC Treatment Programs 
in the Nation 
The MSOP is very different from other SOCC treatment 
programs in the nation by its failure to reduce custody or discharge 
eligible patients, the limited availability of less-restrictive options, its 
 
indicates that the intensity and targets of interventions should match 
the risk and needs of clients—allowing clients to receive too much 
treatment for too long may actually jeopardize public safety. 
Id. at 69. 
 317.  See id. at 48, 69, 76. 
 318.  See Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1162. 
 319.  See id; see also Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at  
37–38 (“In order for a client at MSOP to be judged as ready for possible release, 
the client’s clinical team must agree that he/she has achieved consistent mastery 
on the Matrix Factors, coding of which previous reviewers and evaluators have 
found to be unreliable.”). 
 320.  Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 76. 
 321.  Id. at 73. 
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failure to do anything for clients who no longer benefit from 
treatment, and the difficult petitioning process for a reduction in 
custody.322 These deficiencies result in a number of alarming 
statistics.323 
First, Minnesota boasts “the highest per-capita population of 
civilly committed sex offenders in the nation.”324 Currently, the 
MSOP has 726 civilly committed patients,325 which is a rate of 
approximately 129.4 civilly committed individuals per million 
residents.326 Comparatively, Wisconsin, which began its system in 
1994 very close to the time when the MSOP began, currently has a 
population of 362 clients.327 Wisconsin’s overall commitment rate is 
approximately 53.7 commitments per million residents, North 
Dakota’s rate is 77.8 per million, California’s and New York’s rates 
are 15 per million, and Florida’s rate is 29 per million.328 As of 
2014, Minnesota’s clients made up approximately 15% of the 
nation’s population of civilly committed sex offenders.329 
Second, MSOP clients spend more years on average in civil 
commitment.330 Although the number of years spent in SOCC 
treatment programs varies nationwide depending on the program, 
the average stay is five to seven years.331 As of October 2012, the 
phase progression timeline for clients in the MSOP ranged from six 
to nine years for full completion of Phases I through III.332 In 
reality, civil commitment to the MSOP takes much longer to 
 
 322.  See supra Section III.C.4.e. 
 323.  See supra Section III.C.4.e. 
 324.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1148; see also Expert Report and 
Recommendations, supra note 41, at 74–75 (noting that this is “a number that, per 
capita, is significantly higher than any other SOCC state”). 
 325.  MSOP FAQs, supra note 5; see also Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1148 (“The 
state projects that the number of civilly committed sex offenders will grow to 1215 
by 2022.”). 
 326.  Cf. Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 75. 
 327.  Id. at 89–90. 
 328.  Id. at 75 (citing SOCCPN ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 239, at 6). 
 329.  Of the seventeen programs that responded to the 2014 SOCCPN Survey, 
Minnesota’s program had the highest overall number of civilly committed 
individuals. At the time, Minnesota had 697 of the 4658 total sex offenders civilly 
committed nationwide. SOCCPN ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 239, at 6–7. 
 330.  Compare Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1156, with Expert Report and 
Recommendations, supra note 41, at 27. 
 331.  Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 27. 
 332.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1156. 
41
Woolman and Anderson: Going Against the Grain of the Status Quo: Hopeful Reformations t
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2016
11. Woolman_FF4 (1363-1433) (Do Not Delete) 6/24/2016  11:29 AM 
1404 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1363 
complete than the MSOP’s stated timeframe. Some clients in the 
MSOP have been civilly committed for more than twenty years.333 
Third, the MSOP has the lowest discharge rate of any SOCC 
program in the nation.334 To date, the MSOP has conditionally 
discharged five individuals and has not unconditionally discharged 
anyone.335 Unlike Minnesota, Wisconsin has unconditionally 
discharged 118 individuals336 and has conditionally released around 
135 individuals.337 There are currently 39 individuals on supervised 
release in Wisconsin—the others have been fully discharged.338 New 
York has unconditionally discharged 30 individuals339 and has 
conditionally released 185 individuals,340 while Washington has 
conditionally released 70 individuals and has unconditionally 
discharged 40 people.341 
IV. THE KARSJENS CASE 
While SOCC has a place in the spectrum of options for 
combatting sexual violence, Minnesota has failed to provide a 
system that protects the rights of individuals to receive 
constitutional treatment and to be free from an overreaching 
program that captures many but releases none. The Karsjens case 
provides an opportunity to reform our policies—and to bring 
SOCC back to the size and parameters that it should be to be an 
effective tool. 
A. Background 
There have been many challenges to Minnesota’s Sex 
Offender Civil Commitment laws.342 In 2012, Judge Davis of the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota stayed suits that 
 
 333.  Id. at 1157; see also Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, 
at 47 (“Many clients have been in treatment for 15 years or longer.”). 
 334.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1147. 
 335.  E.g., MSOP FAQs, supra note 5; Expert Report and Recommendations, 
supra note 41, at 65; see also, e.g., Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1147. 
 336.  Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 67. 
 337.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1147. 
 338.  See Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 94. 
 339.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1147; SOCCPN ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 
239, at 14. 
 340.  SOCCPN ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 239, at 13. 
 341.  Id. at 13–14. 
 342.  E.g., Janus & Brandt, supra note 110. 
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posed constitutional questions about Minnesota’s civil commitment 
of sex offenders.343 Shortly thereafter, the firm Gustafson Gluek 
agreed to represent the MSOP patients pro bono.344 
The named plaintiffs in the Karsjens case are fourteen men 
currently housed in the MSOP.345 After Judge Frank certified the 
class, all clients currently housed at the MSOP were incorporated.346 
The plaintiffs filed suit against Minnesota Department of Human 
Services personnel in their official capacities.347 A key point about 
the Karsjens case and its implications is that this case is about the 
entire system in Minnesota—a much broader challenge than the 
kinds of individual relief that Minnesota courts have previously 
addressed in the context of SOCC litigation. 
“The court . . . oversaw extensive attempted settlement 
negotiations,” which were to no avail.348 It also “denied the majority 
of a motion to dismiss, [and] appointed an expert panel to review 
client case files.”349 Finally, the court ordered that the Minnesota 
Department of Human Services Commissioner, Lucinda Jesson, 
create a task force of national experts and stakeholders in the 
case,350 which included Professor Eric Janus of Mitchell Hamline 
School of Law,351 a county attorney,352 and a former chief justice of 
the Minnesota Supreme Court,353 amongst others. The task force’s 
charge was to: 
 
 343.  Karsjens v. Jesson, 283 F.R.D. 514, 516 (D. Minn. 2012); Janus & Brandt, 
supra note 110. 
 344.  Janus & Brandt, supra note 110. 
 345.  Karsjens v. Jesson, 6 F. Supp. 3d 916, 922 (D. Minn. 2014). 
 346.  Id. at 924 (citing Karsjens, 283 F.R.D. at 520); see Janus & Brandt, supra 
note 110. 
 347.  Karsjens, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 916. 
 348.  See Janus & Brandt, supra note 110. 
 349.  Id. 
 350.  Chris Serres, Backlash Grows Against Sex Offender Program, STAR TRIB. (Nov. 
18, 2014), http://www.startribune.com/experts-call-for-expedited-review-of-minn  
-sex-offender-cases/283057251/; Janus & Brandt, supra note 110; see also Karsjens,  
6 F. Supp. 3d at 924. 
 351.  See Chris Serres, Sex Offenders Demand Broad Reforms of Minnesota’s Troubled 
Treatment Program, STAR TRIB. (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.startribune.com/sex      
-offenders-demand-broad-reforms-of-minnesota-s-troubled-treatment-program 
/322353341. 
 352.  See Ostrem, supra note 177, at 698. 
 353.  See Eric Magnuson, Former Chief Justice of Minnesota, Selected for Key Role in 
Sex Offender Lawsuit, STAR TRIB. (July 24, 2015), http://www.startribune.com 
/former-minnesota-supreme-court-chief-magnuson-picked-for-key-role-in-sex          
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“examine and provide recommended legislative proposals 
to the Commissioner” on each of the following topics: (1) 
“[t]he civil commitment and referral process for sex 
offenders”; (2) “[SOCC] options that are less restrictive 
than placement in a secure treatment facility”; and (3) 
“[t]he standards and processes for the reduction in 
custody for civilly committed sex offenders.”354 
B. Arguments 
It is important to understand Defendants’ and Plaintiffs’ 
arguments for and against the constitutionality of the MCTA and its 
relation to the MSOP in order to understand concerns at stake for 
both parties. This case encompasses the dilemma between the 
questions of constitutionality and the State’s interests in public 
safety and the status quo of what has been the MSOP for nearly 
twenty years. The constitutional question of the case was, with over 
700 men (and one woman) civilly committed, and only five people 
having been provisionally discharged in the previous twenty years, 
was the purpose of Minnesota’s commitment of sex offenders 
punitive or legitimate?355 
1. Plaintiffs’ Arguments 
Plaintiffs answered this constitutional question by arguing that 
the very statistics of the lack of release were a guiding factor of the 
constitutionality of the MCTA: 
Of course, the key fact that overwhelms all others is that 
“no one ever gets out.” In the more than [twenty] years 
since the current statute was enacted, not one single 
person has been successfully treated for the purpose of 
“rendering further supervision unnecessary” (i.e. fully 
discharged from the program) which is the primary 
requirement of the statute . . . . That is the key issue . . . 
because this statute and the program that applies it delays, 
 
-offender-lawsuit/318368841. The Honorable Eric J. Magnuson wrote the task 
force’s final report and was a part of the task force. See TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, 
supra note 184, at 1. 
 354.  Karsjens, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 924. The task force issued its final 
recommendations on December 3, 2012. See TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 
184, at 1. 
 355.  Janus & Brandt, supra note 110; see also Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 
1139, 1144 (D. Minn. 2015). 
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and therefore deprives, Class Members of their liberty . . . 
a fundamental right under the United States 
Constitution.356 
More specifically related to Plaintiffs’ facial challenge was 
evidence offered that regular forensic risk assessments are 
necessary to determine whether Class Members continue to meet 
requirements for continued treatment.357 The statute does not 
contain a provision requiring annual risk assessments.358 The only 
formal risk assessment that is done at MSOP occurs as a part of the 
petitioning for release process.359 Because there is no annual risk 
assessment, the current commitment status of hundreds of 
Plaintiffs has never been reviewed.360 Testimony at the trial also 
established that MSOP knows there are Plaintiffs who meet the 
reduction-in-custody criteria or no longer meet commitment 
criteria but who remain confined in the program.361 
Plaintiffs argued that there is no judicial bypass process to the 
statutory reduction-in-custody process.362 There is a single process 
to obtain transfer, provisional release, or full discharge, which leads 
to issues with due process, as some clients are committed who no 
longer should be.363 The process currently in place is fatally flawed 
and unconstitutionally implemented.364 Plaintiffs believe that the 
process takes too long and denies clients services necessary to 
navigate the process.365 
Finally, the Plaintiffs argued that in order to pass 
constitutional muster by living up to the statutorily stated purpose 
of commitment, the statute must “require the MSOP to [take 
affirmative action and] file a petition on behalf of a patient 
[particularly given the diminished capacity of the Class Members] 
 
 356.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139. 
 357.  Id. 
 358.  Id. See generally MINN. STAT. § 253D (2014). 
 359.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139. Most other states have at least annual 
forensic evaluations of patients, completed to continually assess their treatment 
needs and readiness for release. OLA EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 178, at 85. 
 360.  See Janus, supra note 33, at 5. 
 361.  Id. at 6. 
 362.  See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion 
for Summary Judgment at 10, Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139 (No. 11-cv-03659), 
2015 WL 3792764. 
 363.  See id. at 22–23. 
 364.  Id.  
 365.  Id.  
45
Woolman and Anderson: Going Against the Grain of the Status Quo: Hopeful Reformations t
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2016
11. Woolman_FF4 (1363-1433) (Do Not Delete) 6/24/2016  11:29 AM 
1408 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1363 
any time it has a [substantial] reason to believe that the patient 
meets the criteria for a reduction in custody or no longer meets the 
commitment criteria.”366 
In addition, the American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota 
and Eric Janus filed an amicus brief in support of Plaintiffs.367 Their 
focus on the implementation of the scheme provides authority for 
the court to make a ruling of facial unconstitutionality.368 The focus 
of their argument was whether MSOP is a “bona fide civil 
commitment program.”369 They argued that in order to be a bona 
fide program, the State’s purpose may not be the forbidden 
purpose of punishment.370 “The legitimacy of the criminal law 
requires that its distinctive purposes—to punish and deter—be 
forbidden to the [S]tate outside of the criminal law. This is the 
essence of substantive due process.”371 The amicus brief highlighted 
for the court that this situation provides a unique and important 
opportunity for system-wide reform—not just individual relief.372 
The court “has before it two decades of executive and judicial 
implementation, and legislative acquiesce.”373 Here, according to 
the amici brief, the court can look at the “true purpose and 
character of the MSOP scheme to determine whether the MSOP is 
a legitimate civil commitment scheme, or is, instead, an elaborate 
pretext for imposing punishment without the constraints of the 
criminal justice system.”374 
2. Defendants’ Arguments 
Defendants asserted that the MCTA is not unconstitutional 
because of the holding in an Eighth Circuit case, Strutton v. 
Meade.375 In that case, the court ruled that individuals in Missouri’s 
sex offender program did not have a “fundamental right to 
treatment” because the “professional standards” rubric from 
 
 366.  Id. at 23. 
 367.  See Brief of Amici Curiae Eric S. Janus and ACLU-MN, Karsjens, 109 F. 
Supp. 3d 1139 (No. 11-cv-03659). 
 368.  Id. at 4, 21. 
 369.  Id. at 12, 31. 
 370.  Id. at 5. 
 371.  Id. at 6. 
 372.  See id. at 24. 
 373.  Id. at 11. 
 374.  Id. at 11–12. 
 375.  668 F.3d 549 (8th Cir. 2012). 
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Youngberg v. Romeo did not apply.376 Instead, “a ‘shock the 
conscience’ standard applies for judgment” regarding any “right to 
treatment claims.”377 This means that any lack of treatment faced by 
MSOP patients must be “so arbitrary or egregious as to shock the 
conscience.”378 Because of the holding in Strutton, Defendants 
argued that the MCTA does not shock the conscience to a point of 
unconstitutionality.379 
C. Holding 
The Karsjens trial began in February of 2015. After six weeks of 
testimony and arguments, Judge Frank found the MSOP both 
facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional in its implementation 
for twelve specific deficiencies in the MCTA itself and its 
implementation via the MSOP.380 
1. Facially Unconstitutional 
On June 15, 2015, Judge Frank ruled that the MCTA, codified 
as Minnesota Statutes section 253D, is facially unconstitutional.381 
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
substantive due process applies to the Plaintiffs’ claim because the 
MSOP “interferes with the rights implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty.”382 Substantive due process requires civilly committed sex 
offenders must be “mentally ill and pose a substantial danger to the 
public as a result of that mental illness.”383 The court applied strict 
scrutiny because “Plaintiffs’ fundamental right to live free of 
 
 376.  ERIC JANUS, MINN. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., SUMMARY OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES UNDERLYING THE CLAIMS MADE IN KARSJENS (2012), https://mn.gov 
/dhs/images/Points-and-authorities.pdf. 
 377.  Id. 
 378.  Strutton, 668 F.3d at 558. 
 379.  See Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 44, Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139 (D. Minn. 2015) (No.   
11-cv-03659), 2014 WL 9910329. 
 380.  E.g. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1173–74; Chris Serres, Minnesota Sex 
Offender Program Is Ruled Unconstitutional, STAR TRIB. (June 17, 2015, 11:43PM), 
http://www.startribune.com/judge-expected-to-rule-today-in-lawsuit-challenging    
-minnesota-s-sex-offender-program/307884871. 
 381.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1139. 
 382.  Id. at 1166 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)). 
 383.  Id. (emphasis added) (first citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77 
(1992); then citing Call v. Gomez, 535 N.W.2d 312, 319 (Minn. 1995)). 
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physical restraint is constrained by the curtailment of their 
liberty.”384 The court concluded that the state failed to meet its 
burden to show that the MCTA is narrowly tailored to achieve the 
state’s compelling governmental interest in protecting the public.385 
Judge Frank found the MCTA to be facially unconstitutional 
for six reasons.386 First, the MCTA is not narrowly tailored because 
it does not require periodic assessments to determine if MSOP 
committees satisfy the statutory requirements for civil 
commitment.387 For example, in Kansas v. Hendricks, the Supreme 
Court cited Kansas’ yearly risk assessments required under the 
Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act in upholding its 
constitutionality.388 Kansas used yearly risk assessments to determine 
if committees continue to pose a danger to the public, have a 
mental abnormality, and need continued treatment for a sexual 
disorder.389 The MCTA, however, does not require periodic risk 
assessments to determine if committees continue to satisfy the 
statutory requirements of the MCTA.390 
Because the MCTA does not require periodic risk assessments, 
it cannot determine if MSOP inmates continue to be mentally ill, 
which, according to the statute, influences whether the individual is 
likely to reoffend (creating a danger to the public).391 Substantive 
due process requires that a civilly committed individual must be 
mentally ill and pose a substantial danger to the public as the result 
of that mental illness.392 The MCTA is therefore not narrowly 
tailored and violates substantive due process. 
Second, the MCTA is facially unconstitutional “because it fails 
to provide a judicial bypass mechanism to the statutory reduction 
in custody process.”393 MSOP civil committees are only allowed to 
be provisionally or fully discharged by the SRB and SCAP.394 As 
 
 384.  Id. at 1167 (citations omitted). 
 385.  Id. at 1168. 
 386.  Id. at 1168–70.  
 387.  Id. at 1168; supra Section III.C.3. 
 388.  521 U.S. 346, 363–64 (1997). 
 389.  Id. 
 390.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1159; supra Section III.C.3. This creates 
questions of constitutionality under Hendricks. See 521 U.S. at 363–64.  
 391.  See supra Section III.C.4.d. 
 392.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1159 (first citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 
U.S. 71, 77 (1992); then citing Call v. Gomez, 535 N.W.2d 312, 319 (Minn. 1995)). 
 393.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1168–69. 
 394.  MINN. STAT. §§ 253B.18, subdiv. 4c, 253B.19; Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 
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previously noted, the process of appealing to the SRB and SCAP is 
long and cumbersome395 and frequently takes more than five 
years.396 
A judicial bypass option, on the other hand, would permit 
MSOP patients to be heard more rapidly. Additionally, MSOP 
patients are not afforded counsel to help them wade the waters of 
the SRB/SCAP appeals process.397 Judge Frank ruled that because 
the MCTA does not include an emergency mechanism to bypass 
the lengthy SRB/SCAP process, the law is facially unconstitutional 
because patients are not heard in a “reasonable time.”398 Because 
the SRB/SCAP appeals process may take many years, during which 
time a civilly committed individual may no longer be mentally ill or 
dangerous yet still deprived of their liberty,399 the MCTA is facially 
unconstitutional because it does not provide for a judicial bypass 
option.400 
Third, the MCTA is facially unconstitutional because the 
statutory criteria for release are more stringent than the criteria for 
commitment.401 The MCTA requires the offender be “highly likely 
to reoffend” when committed.402 Conversely, the release criteria 
establish a much higher standard—they require the individual to 
“no longer be dangerous.”403 If an individual is committed under a 
statutory standard, that person cannot be committed if they no 
longer meet that statutory standard without violating substantive 
due process.404 Because it is possible for an individual to no longer 
be “highly likely to reoffend” yet not meet the indisputable 
standard of “no longer be[ing] dangerous,” the MCTA violates 
substantive due process, is facially unconstitutional, and results in a 
punitive effect contrary to the purpose of civil commitment.405 
 
1168. 
 395.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1168; see supra Section III.C.4.d. 
 396.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1163; see supra Section III.C.4.d. 
 397.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1163; see supra Section III.C.4.d. 
 398.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1168–69; see supra Section III.C.4.d. 
 399.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1163, 1168–69; see supra Section III.C.4.d. 
 400.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1168–69. 
 401.  Id. at 1169; see also Ostrem, supra note 177, at 698 (calling the MSOP “a 
system with a pretty robust entry point and no realistic exit”). 
 402.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1169. 
 403.  Id. 
 404.  See id. 
 405.  Id. 
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Fourth, the MCTA is facially unconstitutional because the 
SRB/SCAP appeals process requires the offender to maintain the 
burden in proving that he or she is no longer dangerous or needs 
treatment for a mental disorder.406 When a fundamental right is 
involved, laws are subject to strict scrutiny under Fourteenth 
Amendment substantive due process, which requires the state to 
bear the burden of proving that the law is narrowly tailored to serve 
a compelling state interest.407 Judge Frank concluded the burden of 
proof for maintaining commitment should remain on the state 
from the initial commitment proceedings through the appeals 
process.408 The state is required to “demonstrat[e] the justification 
for continued confinement by clear and convincing evidence . . .” 
at all times instead of putting the burden on MSOP patients, as the 
MCTA does.409 Because the MCTA requires patients to demonstrate 
they are no longer mentally ill or are no longer a danger to the 
public, the MCTA is not narrowly tailored and results in a punitive 
effect contrary to the goal of civil commitment.410 
Fifth, the MCTA is facially unconstitutional because it provides 
for less-rights-restrictive treatment centers, yet no such places 
exist.411 MSOP has but three facilities: the high security center in 
Moose Lake, MN; an additional high security center in St. Peter, 
MN; and the CPS in St. Peter, MN.412 
The only less-rights-restrictive option available to MSOP 
patients in either of the two high security centers is the CPS, which 
is deficient in its capacity to house the number of individuals who 
 
 406.  Id. For example, during a SCAP rehearing, “[t]he petitioning party 
seeking discharge or provisional discharge bears the burden of going forward with 
the evidence . . . to show that the person is entitled to the requested relief.” MINN. 
STAT. § 253D.28, subdiv. 2(d) (2014 & Supp. 2015). 
 407.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1166–67 (first citing Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (internal citations and quotations omitted) 
(“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment forbids the government to infringe . . . 
fundamental liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the 
infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”); then 
citing Gallagher v. City of Clayton, 699 F.3d 1013, 1017 (8th Cir. 2012) (internal 
citations omitted) (noting that, where legislation infringes upon a fundamental 
right, such legislation “must survive strict scrutiny—the law must be ‘narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling state interest’”). 
 408.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1169. 
 409.  Id. 
 410.  Id. 
 411.  Id.; see also supra Section III.C.4.b. 
 412.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1150; JOHNSTON, supra note 58. 
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likely qualify for transfer to CPS.413 This certainly does not mean 
that all MSOP patients should be transferred to less-restrictive 
facilities; it merely means that the number of beds available should 
be equivalent to the population of those who are eligible for 
transfer to a less-restrictive facility. Moreover, the only available less-
rights-restrictive alternative, CPS, is located on the same campus as 
the high security center in St. Peter, MN, and the two are barely 
separated by barbed wire fences.414 In addition, CPS programming 
takes years to complete, and because of the limited number of beds 
available, some committed offenders wait for years at a time in a 
unit through which they have previously progressed because there 
is not a bed open in the less-restrictive building to which they seek 
to be transferred.415 
Furthermore, the MCTA requires that individual patients 
petitioning for provisional discharge to a less-rights-restrictive 
facility show that they should be transferred to a “facility [that] best 
meet[s] [their] needs.”416 This is impossible because only one less-
rights-restrictive treatment facility, CPS, exists, and the one that 
does exist houses only fifty-eight beds.417 Because of this, the MCTA 
violates substantive due process, resulting in a punitive effect for 
civilly committed sex offenders.418 
Finally, the MCTA is facially unconstitutional because it lacks 
affirmative action by the state to petition for a committed 
offender’s release if the offender no longer satisfies the statutory 
requirements for civil commitment in the MSOP.419 Despite 
knowledge that some of its patients no longer satisfy the statutory 
requirement for civil commitment, “the MSOP has never 
petitioned on behalf of a committed individual for full 
discharge.”420 The MSOP has petitioned on behalf of only seven 
 
 413.  See Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1150. 
 414.  MSOP REINTEGRATION, supra note 281, at 1; see also Briana Bierschbach, 
The Minnesota Sex Offender Program, Explained, MINN. POST (July 22, 2014), https:// 
www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2014/07/minnesota-sex-offender-program       
-explained.  
 415.  See Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1150. 
 416.  MINN. STAT. § 253D.29, subdiv. 1 (2014); Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 
1169; see also supra Section III.C.4.b.  
 417.  Supra Section III.C.4.b. 
 418.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1169. 
 419.  Id.; see also supra Section III.C.4.b.  
 420.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1164; see also supra Section III.C.4.b.  
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patients for partial discharge.421 Instead, the vast majority of 
committed offenders must initiate their own proceedings.422 
Therefore, the MCTA is not narrowly tailored to meet the state’s 
compelling interest because it does not require the MSOP to take 
affirmative steps to initiate the process for a reduction in custody of 
civilly committed individuals.423 Judge Frank called this a “fatal flaw” 
of the statute—it results in a punitive effect, which is “contrary to 
the purpose of civil commitment.”424 
Judge Frank’s ruling in Karsjens v. Jesson cited six reasons why 
the MCTA is facially unconstitutional.425 Arguably, the Minnesota 
Legislature was hasty in its revision of the MCTA in response to the 
public outcry and significant media attention Linehan’s case 
garnered when the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled in Linehan I 
that he did not meet the statutory requirement for civil 
commitment under the Pearson test.426 Some of the current defects 
are in the text itself as written, and some defects are the result of 
the Minnesota Legislature’s failure to include certain provisions in 
the text of the statute. Each reason demonstrates a fault in the 
MCTA that desperately needs to be repaired in order to mend the 
broken system that is the MSOP. 
 
 421.  See Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1164; see also supra Section III.C.4.b. The 
MSOP petitioned on behalf of six individuals who were supposed to be 
provisionally released, but whose provisional release never happened, because the 
facility they were scheduled to be provisionally discharged to was the Cambridge 
facility, which was never opened. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1164. Governor Mark 
Dayton halted Cambridge’s launch in November of 2013. Id. at 1152. In a letter to 
the Minnesota Department of Human Services Director, Lucinda Jesson, Governor 
Dayton directed her 
to suspend DHS’ plans to transfer any sex offenders to a less restrictive 
facility such as Cambridge until: (1) the Task Force issued its findings 
and recommendations; (2) the legislature had the opportunity to 
review existing statutes and make any necessary revisions; and (3) the 
legislature and the Governor’s Administration have agreed to and 
provided sufficient funding for the additional facilities, programs, and 
staff necessary for the program’s successful implementation.  
Id. The six individuals were never provisionally discharged, and the Cambridge 
facility never opened. Id. at 1164. So, in reality, the MSOP has successfully 
petitioned for the conditional release of a single patient. See id. 
 422.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1164. 
 423.  Id. at 1169. 
 424.  Id. at 1168. 
 425.  Id. at 1168–70. 
 426.  Supra notes 140–41, 145 and accompanying text. 
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2. Unconstitutional as Applied 
In addition to the number of reasons the MCTA is facially 
unconstitutional, Judge Frank ruled the statute is unconstitutional 
as applied (in implementation)427 for an additional six reasons 
because “Defendants apply the statute in a manner that results in 
Plaintiffs being confined to the MSOP beyond such time as they 
either meet the statutory reduction in custody criteria or no longer 
satisfy the constitutional threshold for continued commitment.”428 
First, the MCTA is unconstitutional in its implementation 
because “Defendants do not conduct periodic risk assessments of 
civilly committed individuals at the MSOP.”429 As previously stated, 
this presents serious issues of constitutionality.430 During the trial, 
various MSOP psychologists and defendants stated they were 
unsure if all of the civilly committed offenders met the statutory 
criteria for commitment.431 Although the MCTA does not require 
periodic risk assessments, the statute also does not prohibit them.432 
Periodic risk assessments are generally valid for only one year,433 
and many offenders have not had a risk assessment completed 
since their initial proceedings to determine if they continue to be 
mentally ill and pose a substantial danger to the public because of 
their mental illness. 
In the only case on which the Supreme Court has ruled 
regarding the conditions of sex offender confinement, it stated that 
Washington State must “implement a treatment program for 
residents containing elements required by prevailing professional 
standards.”434 As previously discussed, the vast majority of states with 
SOCC programs conduct annual risk assessments on all offender 
patients.435 The American Psychological Association cites annual 
 
 427.  See supra Section III.A (discussing the change in the implementation of 
the MCTA because of the case of Alfonso Rodriguez, Jr.). 
 428.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1170. 
 429.  Id.; supra notes 384, 387–89 and accompanying text. 
 430.  Compare supra Section II.A.1, with supra Section II.A.2. 
 431.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d, at 1159, 1170.  
 432.  Id.  
 433.  Id. at 1159. 
 434.  Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 266 (2001). Although dicta, this quote is a 
helpful guidepost in helping states develop constitutionally sound practices in 
their civil commitment of sex offenders. 
 435.  Supra note 244 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 36-3708 (West, Westlaw through 2015); IOWA CODE ANN. § 229A.8 (West, Westlaw 
through 2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a08 (West, Westlaw through 2015); Karsjens, 
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psychiatric risk assessments of institutionalized individuals as a best 
practice for practitioners—a “prevailing professional standard.” 
Minnesota does not conduct the annual risk assessments436 as 
required among the prevailing standards of other states’ civil 
commitment programs as well as the American Psychological 
Association prevailing professional standards. 
Additionally, psychological standards require the differentiated 
risk assessment of individuals based on the group or groups to 
which they belong.437 For example, the MSOP uses the same risk 
assessment tools for males, its one female patient, adolescents, and 
individuals with developmental disabilities.438 Arguably, the MSOP 
is required to conduct annual risk assessments that mimic the 
majority of other states because it is the prevailing professional 
standard outlined in Seling v. Young.439 Because the MSOP does not 
do so, it results in a punitive effect, which is contrary to the goal of 
civil commitment and unconstitutional.440 
Second, the MCTA is unconstitutional in its implementation 
because the MSOP has not been conducting the risk assessments 
“in a constitutional manner.”441 Not only have risk assessors not 
received any formal training on the MCTA legal standard that must 
be met for an individual’s continued commitment, but also, they 
have not been applying the correct legal standard under the 
MCTA.442 The correct legal standard is the Call standard, which 
requires that a person be “confined for only so long as he or she 
 
109 F. Supp. 3d at 1159 (“As of 2011, Minnesota and Massachusetts were the only 
two states that did not require annual reports to the courts regarding each sex 
offender’s continuing need to be committed.”); GRANT CUMMINGS, WIS. 
LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BUREAU, CIVIL COMMITMENT OF SEXUALLY VIOLENT PERSONS: 
INFORMAL PAPER 6 (2013), http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lfb/publications 
/informationalpapers/documents/2013/54_civil%20commitment%20of 
%20sexually%20violent%20persons.pdf. 
 436.  Supra note 243 and accompanying text. Minnesota does not conduct 
periodic risk assessments of civilly committed sex offenders, even though the 
statutory scheme for general civil commitment permits it. MINN. STAT. § 253B.03, 
subdiv. 5 (2014). 
 437.  See, e.g., Anthony Beech, Dawn D. Fisher & David Thornton, Risk 
Assessment of Sex Offenders, 34 PROF. PSYCHOL. RES. & PRAC. 339, 347–48 (2003); supra 
Section III(C)(1).  
 438.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1160. 
 439.  See Seling, 531 U.S. at 266. 
 440.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1170. 
 441.  Id. 
 442.  Id. 
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continues both to need further inpatient treatment and supervision 
for his sexual disorder and to pose a danger to the public.”443 
During the Karsjens proceedings, a forensic evaluator for the 
MSOP, Dr. Anne Pascucci,444 admitted she had previously not used 
the Call standard for patient discharge.445 MSOP risk assessors did 
not begin to use this standard until after the Karsjens case started in 
2011.446 Therefore, the MCTA is unconstitutional in its 
implementation through the MSOP because it does not apply the 
correct legal standards set forth in Call.447 
Third, the MCTA is unconstitutional in its implementation 
because there are some MSOP clients who have completed 
treatment and remain confined at MSOP,448 even though they no 
longer benefit from treatment.449 This is likely because of the 
programming changes the MSOP has implemented over the years, 
in which some patients have had to restart treatment when new 
programming is implemented.450 Because the MSOP’s three-phase 
program has undergone many programming changes in its history, 
some individuals have completed three different programs, and 
have not been released.451 Therefore, the MCTA is unconstitutional 
as applied because it is not narrowly tailored in its confinement of 
individuals, some of whom should not remain civilly committed to 
the MSOP.452 
Fourth, the MCTA is unconstitutional in its implementation 
because the discharge process is “not working as [it] should at the 
MSOP.”453 As stated previously, the MSOP refuses to “petition on 
behalf” of individuals who are near the end of treatment.454 Even 
after court proceedings in the Karsjens suit commenced, 
Defendants had yet to address the delays in the “reduction-of-
custody” process.455 The court also found the MSOP did not 
 
 443.  Id. (quoting Call v. Gomez, 535 N.W.2d 312, 319 (Minn. 1995)). 
 444.  Id. at 1159. 
 445.  Id. at 1170. 
 446.  Id. at 1171. 
 447.  Id. 
 448.  Id. at 1158, 1171. 
 449.  Id. at 1171. 
 450.  Id. at 1158. 
 451.  Id. at 1171. 
 452.  Id.  
 453.  Id. 
 454.  Id. at 1171–72; see also supra Section III.C.2.b. 
 455.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1171; see also supra Section III.C.2.b. 
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provide discharge and reintegration planning until committed 
individuals were in Phase III,456 the final phase of treatment.457 
Discharge and reintegration services and programming should 
be given to patients throughout their treatment at the MSOP, 
because the goal of the program is to provide treatment and 
successfully reintegrate individuals into the community after their 
treatment.458 Because committees are not given the reintegration 
and discharge tools they need from the beginning of their 
treatment at the MSOP, if and when individuals are released, their 
toolbox will be emptier than if they had received the tools from day 
one. Moreover, the MSOP’s failure to equip committees with the 
proper tools from the beginning of their treatment is contrary to 
the underlying purpose of the MSOP treatment program—“[t]o 
promote public safety by providing comprehensive treatment and 
reintegration opportunities for civilly-committed [sic] sexual 
abusers.”459 
By refusing to petition on behalf of those who continue to be 
civilly committed, and who likely should be provisionally 
discharged, the MSOP has done nothing to remedy this problem. 
Reintegration and discharge programming is not provided to 
committees until Phase III of treatment programming, and the 
resulting delay in provisional discharge means the MCTA is 
unconstitutional as applied.460 
Fifth, the MCTA is unconstitutional in its implementation 
because the MSOP does not provide for less-restrictive alternatives 
than high-security treatment centers.461 The statute permits the 
MSOP to use less-restrictive alternatives, but none exist.462 Instead, 
all committed individuals must start in a high-security facility, and 
gradually progress to a less-restrictive facility.463 The MSOP lacks 
 
 456.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1171; see also supra Section III.B.2. 
 457.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1153. 
 458.  See MSOP REINTEGRATION, supra note 281, at 1. 
 459.  SHELBY R. RICHARDSON, MINN. SEX OFFENDER PROGRAM, TREATMENT 
PROGRESSION 1 (2016), http://www.dhs.state.mn.us/main/groups/agencywide 
/documents/pub/dhs16_167938.pdf. 
 460.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1171–72. 
 461.  See, e.g., id. at 1169; see also supra Section III.C.2.b. 
 462.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1169; see also supra Section III.C.2.b. 
 463.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1151–52 (“There is no alternative placement 
option to allow individuals to be placed in a less restrictive facility at the time of 
their initial commitment to the MSOP.”). 
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traditional, less-restrictive alternatives, such as halfway houses, for 
those who began their treatment in a high-security facility.464 
The sixth and final reason the MCTA is unconstitutional in its 
implementation is because there is no significant relationship 
between the treatment that individuals receive and the discharge 
rate.465 The aforementioned phases of treatment do not all involve 
treatment for an underlying mental illness, and some of the phases 
primarily focus on rule compliance.466 The extremely low number 
of individuals who have been provisionally discharged is likely due 
to the phases’ stringent rule-based compliance systems.467 
Judge Frank wrote that each of the six reasons is an 
independent reason that the MCTA is itself unconstitutional in 
implementation.468 It is clear that the MSOP’s treatment 
progression criteria and programming make it extremely difficult 
for individuals to progress through treatment. Indeed, in his 
closing comments, Judge Frank described the current MSOP as “a 
three-phased treatment system with ‘chutes-and-ladders’-type 
mechanisms for impeding progression.”469 
D. Aftermath 
Along with the June finding of unconstitutionality, the court 
set a pre-hearing conference for August 10, 2015.470 Judge Frank 
ordered the parties to submit remedy proposals and called upon 
other stakeholders to do the same.471 Many stakeholders attended 
this meeting including Governor Dayton.472 Defendants sought 
certification for an interlocutory appeal from the district court to 
appeal the June 17th decision; that request was denied by Judge 
 
 464.  Id. at 1152; see supra Section II.C.2.b. 
 465.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1172 (“[I]ndividuals get stuck in Phase I of 
the program, a part of the program where no specific offender-related therapy is 
provided, only institutional rule compliance training and preparation for 
therapy.”). 
 466.  Id. at 1153, 1172. 
 467.  See id. at 1147. 
 468.  Id. at 1172. 
 469.  Id. 
 470.  Id. at 1178. 
 471.  Id.  
 472.  Chris Serres & Patrick Condon, Gov. Dayton Unveils Possible Reforms to 
Troubled Sex Offender Program, STAR TRIB. (Aug. 10, 2015), http:// 
www.startribune.com/lawmakers-arrive-at-st-paul-courthouse-as-msop-hearing         
-begins/321260851/. 
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Frank.473 On October 29, 2015, Judge Frank issued his First Interim 
Relief Order, which required the following: 
a. Defendants must promptly conduct independent risk 
and phase placement reevaluation of all current patients 
at the MSOP. . . . Defendants must complete these 
assessments according to the following time lines: 
i. Within 30 days, Defendants shall complete 
reevaluations of the six individuals in the Alternative 
Program who were designated for transfer to 
Cambridge, Eric Terhaar, and Rhonda Bailey. 
ii. Within 30 days, Defendants shall submit a detailed 
plan for approval by the Special Master for the 
reevaluations of the elderly, individuals with 
substantive physical or intellectual disabilities, and 
juvenile-only offenders. . . . 
. . . . 
b. If the independent risk assessment for any patient 
concludes that the patient should be fully discharged, 
transferred, or receive a reduction in custody, the MSOP 
must seek the release or reduction in custody of that 
patient to the appropriate placement by immediately 
filing a petition with the Special Review Board . . . . 
c. Defendants must ensure that less restrictive alternatives 
are available to accommodate all individuals found 
eligible for a reduction in custody. . . . 
d. Following each treatment phase placement 
reevaluation . . . Defendants shall immediately move any 
individual who is determined to be in an improper 
treatment phase into the proper treatment phase. . . . 
e. Defendants shall establish a plan to conduct annual, 
independent risk assessments to determine whether each 
client still satisfies the civil commitment requirements. . . . 
. . . . 
2. Special Master former Minnesota Supreme Court Chief 
Justice Eric J. Magnuson shall have authority to monitor 
compliance with the remedies identified above.474 
Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal with the District Court 
and requested an immediate stay from the October 29th interim 
 
 473.  Karsjens v. Jesson, No. 11-3659, 2015 WL 4478972, at *4 (D. Minn. July 
22, 2015). 
 474.  Karsjens v. Jesson, No. 11-3659, 2015 WL 6561712, at *16–17 (D. Minn. 
Oct. 29, 2015) (citation omitted), appeal docketed, No. 15-3485 (8th Cir. Nov. 2, 
2015). 
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relief order pending their appeal.475 On November 23, 2015, Judge 
Frank denied Defendants’ request for an injunction.476 There are 
four factors to consider when determining whether to grant a 
request for a stay, including: “(1) whether the movant has a strong 
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant will be 
irreparably harmed absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay 
will substantially injure the non-moving party; and (4) the public 
interest.”477 Judge Frank acknowledged that the first two factors of 
this analysis were most important.478 
Judge Frank did not find within Defendants’ claims a strong 
likelihood that they would succeed on appeal.479 He emphasized 
that Defendants’ reliance on experts and the expert report did not 
bolster their claims of likely success on appeal.480 The court’s 
conclusion that the MSOP is unconstitutional was based primarily 
on testimony from Defendants’ own employees.481 Judge Frank 
found that Defendants did not meet their burden with respect to 
the irreparable harm that would occur without a stay.482 Specifically, 
he found that Defendants’ right to appeal will not be impacted by 
denying their request for a stay.483 Further, Defendants failed to 
propose alternative timelines to those set out in the court’s 
October 29th order, which would have provided relief from their 
immediate concerns about logistics and funding.484 
On December 15, 2015, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
granted Defendants’ request for a stay on Judge Frank’s October 
29th order.485 On November 2, 2015, Defendants appealed Judge 
 
 475.  Karsjens v. Jesson, No. 11-3659, 2015 WL 7432333, at *1 (D. Minn. Nov. 
23, 2015). 
 476.  Id. at *7. 
 477.  Id. at *2 (citations omitted). 
 478.  Id. (citing Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009)) (“[T]he first two 
factors are the most critical.”). 
 479.  Id. at *5. 
 480.  Id. at *3. 
 481.  Id. 
 482.  Id. at *5. 
 483.  Id. 
 484.  Id. at *6 (“By failing to [propose how they could remedy the 
unconstitutional infirmities at the MSOP], Defendants have effectively created 
their own administrative and financial difficulties by forcing the Court to impose a 
remedy in the absence of Defendants’ own detailed input.”). 
 485.  Karsjens v. Jesson, No. 11-3659, 2015 WL 6561712 (D. Minn. Oct. 29, 
2015) (citation omitted), appeal docketed, No. 15-3485 (8th Cir. Nov. 2, 2015). 
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Frank’s finding of the MSOP’s unconstitutionality.486 Oral 
arguments before the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals took place 
on April 12, 2016.487 
The Karsjens case demonstrates the inherently difficult task of 
balancing sex offenders’ personal liberty and the state’s compelling 
interest of keeping communities safe, as this is problematic line to 
toe.488 There is only so much a court can do to effect actual change 
at MSOP. As cases challenging the constitutionality of civil 
commitment systems have made clear, a “win” in this setting does 
not result in immediate action.489 As the case of Turay v. Seling 
illustrates, system change in a long standing and entrenched 
unconstitutional SOCC program is difficult to achieve.490 Change 
comes slowly, and the court can only order Defendants to take 
action to make changes—the court cannot allocate funds, require 
MSOP to hire new leadership, or change public opinion about an 
issue that has proven divisive for decades. The court is limited by 
separation of powers. The legislature can allocate funding. As 
executives, the Governor and Commissioner of Health and Human 
Services make decisions about hiring and leadership.491 However, 
even given these limitations, a huge step forward for MSOP would 
be coming into constitutional compliance—that is, releasing 
individuals within the program when their risk level falls below 
 
 486.  Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139 (D. Minn. 2015), appeal docketed, 
No. 15-3485 (8th Cir. Nov. 2, 2015). 
 487.  Id. 
 488.  For a look at a former sex offender’s take on civil commitment, see ONCE 
FALLEN, http://www.oncefallen.com (last visited Mar. 16, 2016). Derek Logue is 
the creator of the website and a former sex offender, and he has been on 
numerous national television shows to advocate for changes in policies regarding 
the treatment of sex offenders. Id. Mr. Logue, with his endless connections, 
including men whom he writes to who are currently civilly committed for sexual 
offenses, did not know a single person who had been released from SOCC. He 
only knew individuals who are currently civilly committed, which says a lot about 
our current system of SOCC. E-mail from Derek Logue, Reform Advocate & 
Owner, Once Fallen, to Jennifer Anderson, Author (Nov. 1, 2015, 19:32 CST) (on 
file with author). 
 489.  Douglas Smith, The Constitutionality of Civil Commitment and the Requirement 
of Adequate Treatment, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1383, 1384 (2008). 
 490.  Id. at 1383–84. 
 491.  See generally Bierschbach, supra note 414 (discussing the differential 
powers of the federal court, the state, and the legislature on affecting change in 
the MSOP). 
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constitutional thresholds for commitment.492 Next, the court’s 
recommendations and lessons from Seling are discussed. This 
comment then recommends changes that lie beyond the court’s 
reach—namely funding, changing the culture within MSOP and 
implementing strategies to alter public opinions of sex offenders 
and MSOP. 
E. The Court’s Recommendations 
The court has the power to order named defendants to take 
certain actions.493 The court’s order in this case largely follows the 
expert report, a detailed and comprehensive assessment of MSOP 
by a group of national experts in the field.494 Like the Seling case, 
discussed below, the court’s recommendations focus on providing 
adequate treatment to individuals at MSOP that meets 
constitutional muster.495 Not only did the expert panel in this case 
spend diligent time at the facilities interviewing patients and staff,496 
the panel brings their own expertise—using research and best 
practices in the field to inform their recommendations.497 The 
report is a road map for change at MSOP—Judge Frank viewed it as 
such.498 The court made sound recommendations relating to 
annual evaluations, the process of moving between phases of 
treatment, and in requiring that less-restrictive alternatives be made 
available immediately to all those individuals who no longer meet 
commitment standards.499 
Like the court in Seling, Judge Frank did not choose to order 
the immediate release of any named defendants.500 The expert 
report in this case advocated for the immediate release of those 
individuals who no longer met commitment criteria.501 The experts 
 
 492.  Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1159 (D. Minn. 2015); Expert 
Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 5.  
 493.  See generally Karsjens v. Jesson, 6 F. Supp. 3d 916 (D. Minn. 2014). 
 494.  Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 3–6. 
 495.  See generally Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139. 
 496.  See Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 3–4, 9–10. 
 497.  Id. at 61. 
 498.  Compare Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1149–51, with Expert Report and 
Recommendations, supra note 41. 
 499.  See Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1176–77. 
 500.  Id. at 1144. 
 501.  Id. at 1151; Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 11, 
61. 
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focused on four special categories of individuals who may be 
immediately released or moved into less-restrictive alternatives.502 
They focused on juvenile-only offenders, patients with severe 
mental illness, patients in assisted living, and clients with disabilities 
in the alternative program, including one female MSOP patient.503 
The immediate release of certain individuals by the court is likely 
not the best way to help those individuals or the communities to 
which they are returning.504 Some planning needs to be done to 
facilitate more releases.505 In particular, alternative monitoring and 
therapeutic services need to be available in communities where 
individuals are released to help ensure their long-term success.506 
However, for individuals who no longer meet commitment criteria 
and the woman who is housed within the all-male MSOP facility, 
their releases should be given the highest priority and should occur 
as soon as feasible.507 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In addition to ruling on the MCTA’s constitutionality, Judge 
Frank made recommendations to defendants about what should be 
done about the MSOP.508 The court’s recommendations largely 
mirror those of the expert report and include: requiring risk 
assessments and phase evaluation of all individuals as soon as 
possible to determine whether clients meet treatment criteria; 
requiring a variety of less-restrictive alternatives; revising discharge 
process; and requiring MSOP to take affirmative steps in several 
critical areas, including affirmatively filing petitions for discharge.509 
The court also recommended greater oversight to the commitment 
process, including a judicial bypass system and qualified training 
and evaluation of MSOP employees on a regular basis.510 The 
court’s final recommendation was that a special master be 
 
 502.  Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 9. 
 503.  Id. 
 504.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1144–45. 
 505.  Id. 
 506.  Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 6; see also 
Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1147. 
 507.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1151; see also Expert Report and 
Recommendations, supra note 41, at 22.  
 508.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1173–75. 
 509.  Id. 
 510.  Id. 
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appointed.511 The court appointed former Minnesota Supreme 
Court Justice Eric Magnuson to this role. 
A. Lessons from Turay v. Seling 
Other courts have ruled on similar challenges in federal court. 
For example, in 1994, Washington State decided the case of Turay 
v. Seling.512 There, plaintiffs did not challenge the constitutionality 
of the statute, but rather the conditions of treatment.513 The Seling 
case, however, still provides some basis of comparison to assess 
Judge Frank’s potential remedies and how successful they might 
be.514 
In Seling, the U.S. district court found that Washington’s SOCC 
program failed to meet professionally reasonable standards for 
treatment.515 The court enjoined defendants to take certain steps to 
make sure adequate mental health treatment was available.516 When 
the process was slow, the court ultimately appointed a special 
master to monitor the state’s compliance.517 After five years and 
seventeen progress reports, the court issued a contempt order 
against defendants based on their continuing failure to comply 
with the injunction.518 The case lingered in the system for fifteen 
years before the injunction was eventually lifted.519 This illustrates 
the entrenched nature of SOCC programs—and how challenging 
court-ordered remedies can be to actually implement. The Eighth 
Circuit injunction pending an appeal has put a halt to any initial 
steps to implement the court ordered recommendations relating to 
the adequacy of the MSOP treatment.520 
B. Author Recommendations 
The court does not have control over funding and hiring 
policies that are necessary to affect change in the statutes that 
 
 511.  Id. 
 512.  Turay v. Seling, 108 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (W.D. Wash. 2008). 
 513.  Id. at 1149. 
 514.  Smith, supra note 489, at 1384; see also Seling, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 1149. 
 515.  See Seling, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 1158. 
 516.  Id. 
 517.  Id. 
 518.  Id.; JANUS, supra note 376, at 5. 
 519.  JANUS, supra note 376, at 5. 
 520.  Karsjens v. Jesson, No. 11-3659, 2015 WL 6561712 *1 (D. Minn. Oct. 29, 
2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-3485 (8th Cir. Nov. 2, 2015). 
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impact MSOP.521 Minnesota’s Department of Human Services and 
the state legislature hold a huge amount of power with respect to 
reforming MSOP.522 They must allocate increased funding to 
support recommendations from the court.523 Judge Frank, even 
after his initial finding of unconstitutionality, tried to engage state 
leadership to craft a remedy.524 These engagement strategies have 
proven largely unsuccessful and Minnesota, like Washington in 
Seling, may be looking at a long period of protracted litigation, lack 
of compliance with the court’s order, and very few individuals 
being released. 
There are critical steps that could be taken outside of the 
court’s order that would impact how sex offenders are treated in 
Minnesota—and how the MSOP functions. These strategies 
include: allocating funding to support staff and resources to 
provide adequate treatment and less-restrictive alternatives; a 
change in leadership in MSOP that would facilitate reform in 
training and a change in the culture of staff and management 
within the facilities; and engaging volunteers and the media to 
improve awareness to reframe the public’s perspective about sexual 
offenders. 
The Governor and Legislature have had several legislative 
sessions to address the issues plaguing MSOP during the pendency 
of the Karsjens litigation.525 The biggest barrier to making necessary 
changes at MSOP is a lack of state funding to support these 
changes.526 Currently, the money that the State of Minnesota is 
spending on the program is not constitutionally sound. This 
problem already costs $120,000 per year per person, but in order to 
effectuate needed changes and pass constitutional muster more 
funding may be needed.527 Specifically, funding is needed to 
provide staff to conduct regular reviews and to create meaningful, 
safe, and well-designed less-restrictive alternatives for individuals 
who are released.528 This funding is needed to provide additional 
 
 521.  See Seling, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 1148.  
 522.  See Brandt and Prescott, supra note 11. 
 523.  See id. 
 524.  Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1178 (D. Minn. 2015). 
 525.  Brandt and Prescott, supra note 11. 
 526.  See generally Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 7–10. 
 527.  E.g. Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 71. 
 528.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1160; Expert Report and Recommendations, 
supra note 41, at 7–8. 
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resources and staff at the Moose Lake facility.529 Resources and staff 
are also needed within the communities in which individuals are 
released.530 However, if individuals were moved to less-restrictive 
settings in the community, funding that is now being spent on 
housing people within the commitment programs at Moose Lake 
and St. Peter would be saved .531 
The Rule 706 Expert Report details some of the challenges 
that MSOP has had in finding and retaining qualified staff at its 
facilities.532 It notes in its recommendations relating to the Moose 
Lake facility in particular, “the near impossible challenge of 
recruiting, hiring, retaining, training, and supervising professional 
and front line staff for an extremely large facility with a very diverse 
specialized population in a rural community.”533 One way to find 
and retain qualified staff would be to collaborate with nearby 
colleges or universities that have professors or students in need of 
clinical supervision hours or internship possibilities. The St. Peter 
facility is twelve miles from Mankato State University and the Moose 
Lake facility is forty miles from the University of Minnesota Duluth. 
Both schools have undergraduate and graduate social work 
programs and nursing programs, and Duluth has a medical school. 
California’s SOCC program has had success with this type of 
partnership.534 There the SOCC  
hospital is a partner with both West Hills College-Coalinga 
and Fresno City College. Through its psychiatric 
technician education program, West Hills College has 
provided the hospital with hundreds of graduates over the 
course of many years. Similarly, about 400 registered 
nurses from Fresno City College have completed clinical 
rotation in our hospital. DSH-Coalinga is currently 
forming a new partnership with two California universities 
to create clinical rotations for medical students.535 
 
 529.  Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 58. 
 530.  E.g. Kay Fate, Local Officials Concerned About Sex Offender Release Funding, 
POST-BULL. (June 15, 2015), http://www.postbulletin.com/news/local/local           
-officials-concerned-about-sex-offender-release-funding/article_294ea2aa-6198       
-5116-83fa-b16e03a40bd3.html. 
 531.  Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 71. 
 532.  Id. at 56. 
 533.  Id. 
 534. Department of State Hospitals—Coalinga, CA DEP’T ST. HOSPS., http:// 
www.dsh.ca.gov/coalinga (last visited May 20, 2016). 
 535.  Id. 
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Resources and staff are also needed in the communities where 
individuals will be released.536 This includes hiring additional 
probation agents trained to work with sexual offenders in the 
community. The expert report recognizes that: 
Specialized supervision for people who have sexually 
offended is necessary because traditional supervision 
practices do not necessarily address the high-risk factors 
associated with some people who have sexually offended. 
For example, traditional supervision officers may not have 
received specific training that would enhance their 
understanding of the risk factors and dynamics related to 
sexual offending, which may impact an officer’s ability to 
intervene with or interpret any pre-offense behaviors. 
Additionally, it is important to limit the amount of cases 
each supervision officer receives in order for officers to 
better manage and monitor people who have sexually 
offended adjustment to the community.537 
As the Rule 706 Expert Report highlights, funding is also 
needed to provide community-based treatment programs and 
transportation to these programs.538 
The Expert Report makes specific recommendations with 
respect to resources, staffing, and training.539 However, the court 
cannot make the Legislature pay for court ordered 
recommendations. The court’s proverbial stick is to continue to 
bring the Department and MSOP back into court if the 
recommendations are not met.540 But like Seling, this back and forth 
can last for years.541 Thus far, the leadership at MSOP has not 
advocated for this type of funding. A change in culture and 
leadership at MSOP may be necessary before the kinds of funding, 
resource, and staff changes discussed above become a reality. 
One of the most painful parts of the Expert Report was its 
documentation of the toxic culture that exists at MSOP.542 This 
 
 536.  Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1175 (D. Minn. 2015); Expert 
Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 61. 
 537.  Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 61. 
 538.  Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1160; Expert Report and Recommendations, 
supra note 41, at 71. 
 539.  See generally Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41; see also 
Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1160. 
 540.  See Turay v. Seling 108 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (W.D. Wash. 2008).  
 541.  Smith, supra note 489, at 1411–13. 
 542.  Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 52–53; see also 
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includes the culture among individuals housed within the program 
and employees. The Expert Report documents the hopelessness of 
both individuals housed there and the staff.543 None believe that 
release is possible.544 The status quo is too entrenched. This needs 
to change in order for the program to function in a healthy way. 
New leadership is needed. As the Expert Report states in its 
conclusion, “[T]here is a great deal of opportunity in Minnesota 
for political courage.”545 MSOP needs someone with that political 
courage to change this flawed program. 
The report finds that in a “healthy” SOCC treatment program, 
staff within the program identify individuals who are eligible for 
release based on treatment criteria.546 The staff are responsible and 
see it as a part of their role to help clients eligible for release to 
actually be released.547 The Expert Report also documents the 
punitive nature of some aspects of the treatment program that 
hinder progress.548 These include punishing people for normal 
infractions by forcing them to regress in treatment.549 A better 
practice would be to not link non-sexually related behavioral 
offenses to treatment goals or success.550 MSOP is supposed to be 
about treatment and not punishment.551 Staff must be trained in 
best practices.552 
The report documents specific trainings that MSOP staff 
should receive.553 These include training to work with specialized 
populations, training in current diagnostic criteria consistent with 
DSM-5 criteria, training in deviant sexual interests, and training in 
relevant interventions with problematic clients.554 Leadership that is 
willing to demand up-to-date trainings, all-staff participation, and 
 
Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1151. 
 543.  Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 52–53. 
 544.  Id. 
 545.  Id.at 54–56, 79. 
 546.  Id. at 54–56. 
 547.  Id. at 54. 
 548.  Id. at 52. 
 549.  Id. 
 550.  Id. 
 551.  Id. 
 552.  Id. at 52, 54–57. 
 553.  Id. 
 554.  Id. at 41, 54. 
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actualize training into practice is necessary to change the culture at 
MSOP.555 
New thinking is needed from the top to the bottom. MSOP 
cannot change if its leadership does not believe there is a 
problem.556 Leadership must address the program’s fundamental 
flaws and be willing to implement changes despite reluctance to do 
so from the staff and public. Moreover, new leadership may also be 
able to engage the public and media in efforts to reshape public 
perception. 
In addition, public opinion about the release of sex offenders 
must shift in order for MSOP to be successful. The public must 
accept the release of individuals from MSOP into communities as a 
normal part of the program’s trajectory. As local expert Eric Janus 
has so aptly pointed out, “sexual predator laws give a loud 
expression to our collective disapproval of sexual violence.”557 
One study of public perception of sex offenders found that: 
[T]he public is poorly informed about sex offenders . . . . 
Specifically, myths of extraordinarily high recidivism rates 
and “stranger danger” prevail, and the public appears to 
view all sex offenders as posing a similar threat to 
communities. These widespread beliefs perpetuate the 
development of increasingly restrictive policies as 
politicians endeavor to serve their constituents.558 
These beliefs exist despite research and literature, which finds 
that most sex offenders “can and do return to the community 
without engaging in further sexual violence.”559 
One way to begin shifting public perceptions about the release 
of sex offenders is to develop Circles of Support and Accountability 
(CoSA).560 CoSA is a “model of professionally supported 
 
 555.  Id. 
 556.  See, e.g., D.J. Tice, Tough Thing, Isn’t It, This ‘Due Process’?, STAR TRIB., Feb. 
3, 2014, LEXIS. 
 557.  JANUS, supra note 1, at 145. 
 558.  Jill S. Levenson et al., Public Perceptions About Sex Offenders and Community 
Protection Policies, 7 ANALYSES SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 137, 155 (2007). 
 559.  Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 72; see also 
Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1159 (D. Minn. 2015). Fewer than four 
percent of the public felt that community awareness was more effective than 
chemical castration to effect recidivism in Florida. Levenson et al., supra note 558, 
at 155. Florida is a state that has released 150 sex offenders from their SOCC 
system. Id. 
 560.  See Expert Report and Recommendations, supra note 41, at 72.  
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volunteerism, in which trained community members volunteer to 
provide support and an accountability framework to a released 
high-risk/need sexual offender.”561 This program consists of two 
concentric circles—the inner circle being the released offender 
and four to six community volunteers.562 The outer circle is made 
up of local professionals (treatment providers, law enforcement, 
probation staff, and other personnel) who provide support to the 
inner circle when needed.563 CoSA has been effective at reducing 
recidivism among high-risk offenders.564 The program also educates 
community members about the realities of sex offenders—such as 
the affirmation that they can live, work, and contribute without 
reoffending.565 This aspect of the program helps dispel some of the 
myths commonly held about sex offenders and re-offending. 
Some states, such as Wisconsin, have effectively utilized 
community notification meetings and other public relations 
strategies to assuage public fear and outrage over the release of 
committed individuals.566 The benefits of community notification 
meetings include providing relevant and accurate factual 
information to community members as well as the media.567 In this 
format, citizens can be educated on the likelihood of re-offense, 
community strategies to prevent sexual violence, and information 
about sexual offender civil commitment laws and treatment 
efficacy.568 The Expert Report points out, “[a]t a person-to-person 
level, community notification meetings provide concerned citizens 
with opportunities to interact directly with relevant law 
enforcement, DHS, DOC and other professionals who become 
known potential contacts should subsequent questions or problems 
arise after the meeting or after the community placement.”569 
Often, the media attends community notification meetings and is 
able to reach a broader audience by reporting on the facts and 
information presented at these meetings.570 Thus, the meetings not 
 
 561.  Id. 
 562.  Id. 
 563.  Id.  
 564.  Id. 
 565.  Id. 
 566.  Id. at 96. 
 567.  Id. at 97. 
 568.  Id. 
 569.  Id. 
 570.  Id. 
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only provide information to community members, but also serve a 
public relations purpose through broader media coverage. In many 
states, leadership within the SOCC program regularly interacts with 
media and the community to provide accurate information and to 
help break down fear and stigma.571 
The media also plays an important role in creating accurate 
public awareness about sex offenders. 
The media should be enlisted as a partner in educating 
the public about sexual abuse through the dissemination 
of accurate and research-based information about sexual 
violence, sexual perpetrators, and victimization. Rather 
than sensationalistic journalism, the public would benefit 
from factual information about recidivism rates, the 
heterogeneity of sex offenders, the signs and symptoms of 
sexual abuse, and the common types of grooming 
behaviors used by perpetrators who gain access to victims 
by using their positions of familiarity, trust, or authority.572 
The media is very good at inciting fear in the public when it 
covers violent and rare cases like that of Dru Sjodin. However, if 
the media provided accurate information about the risk of sex 
offenders re-offending or the effectiveness of community-based 
treatment programs even for high-risk offenders, programs like 
MSOP would have a much easier time releasing individuals safely 
into communities. The media could be a powerful partner in 
Minnesota to begin the necessary shift in public awareness about 
sex offenders. A shift in public opinion would also make legislative 
change more palatable. Increasing knowledge, sharing accurate 
information, and presenting images to the public of sex offenders 
that do not shock us are needed in order to begin swinging the 
pendulum back to a more balanced place on this issue within the 
public sphere. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Karsjens case highlights what happens when a system set 
up to protect the public becomes a political tool—one where 
public outrage supersedes rehabilitation and due process. The 
public’s propensity to react swiftly through punitive legislation to 
singular violent crimes does not make sound policy. As discussed, 
 
 571.  See id. at 97–98. 
 572.  Levenson et al., supra note 558, at 156. 
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the public responded strongly to violent crimes and criminals—
such as the rape and murder of Dru Sjodin and the case of Dennis 
Linehan. Public opinion was inflamed and the Minnesota 
Legislature reacted swiftly in the statutory criteria for SOCC and 
the way in which the MCTA is implemented. However, the long-
term consequences to this rush to action have proven ineffective 
and unconstitutional. Having a SOCC system that is 
unconstitutional is also harmful to the public and erodes our trust 
in due process and fundamental fairness. 
We need to right the balance between fear and fairness. 
Minnesotans should be horrified to read about the situation at 
MSOP that has been revealed through the Karsjens case. There are 
individuals who have essentially been in a prison-like facility for 
more than twenty years who should not be there. They have been 
robbed of their freedom and an opportunity to contribute in a 
meaningful way to their communities and families. With the 
Karsjens case, the court began to identify the steps needed to bring 
our SOCC system back into constitutional compliance. 
Thanks to a detailed report by a national panel of experts—the 
Rule 706 Expert Report—we also have a road map for broader 
change of the sort that cannot be brought about simply by a court 
order. This includes a need for additional funding, a change in 
leadership at MSOP, and community and media assistance to better 
inform the public. Any change will involve multiple stakeholders, 
and will take time. But a first step will be the assessment and 
possible subsequent release of individuals from MSOP who no 
longer meet the statutory criteria for SOCC. This will signal that 
change has, in fact, finally come. 
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